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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Apart from being used for fiscal purposes, the tax system can be used to
stimulate the investment in the real sector of a transition economy. In terms
of this task, one of the basic elements of the tax system is depreciation. It
is used to transfer the cost of assets to the costs of the product. Thus,
depreciation has a direct effect on the tax base for the corporate profit tax.
Additionally, depreciation policy determines the residual cost of assets, which
is the tax base of property tax. Hence, an increase in depreciation charges
reduces the tax base of the property and income tax and can potentially act
as a stimulus for investments. Acute interest in the depreciation mechanism
may be also attributed to the fact that depreciation charges are, at present, an
important source of capital budgeting for enterprises in the Russian economy.
The present study focuses on the modeling of the mechanism of accelerated
depreciation that is aimed at attracting investments to new venture projects
in the Russian real sector. Such models should be careful to include a certain
number of factors.
First, there is an uncertainty related to the fluctuations of market prices for
inputs and outputs, as well as investment resources that are needed for es-
tablishment of a firm. Consideration of this factor requires to model the cash
flows of the future firm as a random process.
Second, unlike portfolio investments, investments in the new project are sunk
costs, i.e. that they cannot be used for other purposes once the firm is set up.
And the third factor, which should also be taken into account, is the fiscal
environment that the company is supposed to operate in. In this paper,
the fiscal environment consists of corporate income tax, VAT, unified social
tax, enterprise property tax, personal income tax, mechanisms of accelerated
depreciation and tax holidays. Inclusion of the taxes listed above in the model
makes if fully comply with the tax environment defined by the new Tax Code
of the Russian Federation.
The behavior of potential investor is assumed to be rational. Observing the
market prices, investor can decide either to invest in the project or postpone
the decision until the situation becomes more favorable. When making a
decision, the investor also considers various potentially adverse events that
may result in partial losses of property and profit. The investor uses available
information to choose the best moment for investment in order to maximize
its net present value (NPV).
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This study elaborates and analyzes a model of investor’s behavior which takes
into account all the factors mentioned above. The model is set up in con-
tinuous time. It is also assumed that the processes describing the dynamics
of investment and the flows of value added are geometric Brownian motions.
These assumptions allow us to employ the well known analytical methods of
the theory of diffusion processes. Those methods were used in order to obtain
an optimal investment rule and to explicitly construct the dependence of such
a rule on the tax system’s parameters.
The analysis revealed an unexpected phenomenon related to the simultaneous
use of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation. In particular, we indicate the
conditions under which an increase in depreciation charges (in conjunction with
tax holidays) leads to a delay of the investor’s arrival. Similarly, an increase in
tax holidays under certain conditions can delay the investor’s arrival. In other
words, simultaneous usage of the two exemptions may entail negative effects.
The issue of compensation for risk process by tax exemptions was studies as
well. It is demonstrated that there are critical values of the parameter defining
the risk process. If they are exceeded, compensation for the risks taken by the
investor either by decreasing the rate of profit tax or increasing depreciation
charges will be impossible. This phenomenon can partly explain why there
was no splash of investment after the adoption of the new profit tax law.
In this paper, the former system of profit taxation (that is characterized by
allowance for tax exemptions such as tax holidays and accelerated deprecia-
tion) is compared to the new tax system that provide a significantly lower rate
of profit tax, but no exemptions. It is shown that the new system is more
preferable than the old one since it encourages investment, especially for firms
with a high share of active assets.
The investor model served as a basis in order to obtain an optimal deprecia-
tion policy that maximizes expected tax revenues in the regional budget. This
policy turned out to be beneficial for the federal budget and for the investor in
the case of projects with a large part of active assets, average labor intensity
(in term of wage per unit of value added) and moderate volatility.
In conclusion, in view of the announced property tax reform, it is especially
interesting to study the replacement of the property tax by a real estate tax,
which exists in most of the market economies. In Russia this replacement has
been legally introduced as an experiment in Tver and Novgorod since 1997.
The authors prove that such a replacement would encourage the investors to
prefer capital-intensive projects whose share of active capital assets exceeds a
certain critical value depending on parameters of the model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A long-term social and economic development program in a typical Russian re-
gion is closely tied with the implementation of few critical investment projects.
Attracting investors to those projects is a key objective of such a program.
One way to solve this problem is the use of fiscal mechanisms such as invest-
ment incentives.
The present paper is dedicated to the analysis of the potential that the de-
preciation mechanisms have in attracting investment to new projects. Depre-
ciation, as it is well known, is the economic mechanism for the transfer of
the cost of assets to the cost of the product (Article 253 of Tax Code of the
Russian Federation, or briefly TC RF hereinafter). Thus depreciation has a
direct impact on the corporate profit tax base. The depreciation of assets also
changes their residual cost, which forms the pboperty tax base. Therefore, an
increase in depreciation deductions can lead to a reduction of the enterprise’s
fiscal payments and could, consequently, be used to attract investment.
According to Article 258 of TC RF, depreciable property is divided into ten
groups, depending on their useful lifetime. In accordance with article 259
of TC RF, depreciation is calculated with either the linear (straight line) or
the non-linear (formerly called declining balance) method. The depreciation
is accumulated according to the depreciation rate which is an inverse to the
asset’s useful lifetime. With linear method, the amount of the accumulated
depreciation (per month) is equal to the product of the asset ’s acquisition
cost and the depreciation rate. With the non-linear method, the amount
of accumulated depreciation (per month) is defined as the product of the
asset’s residual cost and the rate of depreciation (which is twice as high as
the corresponding rate for the linear method).
Article 284 of TC RF establishes the new profit tax rate to be 24% (instead of
35% under the former law). Of this, 7.5% are included in the federal budget,
14.5% — in the regional budgets and 2% — in the local budgets. From
our point of view, there is a certain similarity with the former tax holidays
mechanism, since regional authorities are permitted to reduce the regional
profit tax rate for specific categories of taxpayers, but not more than by 4%.
The amounts of depreciation accrued and property tax paid depend, to a
considerable degree, on the enterprise’s accounting policy. According to the
accounting rules that apply to capital funds (PBU 6/01) adopted in 2001,
commercial organizations are authorized to revaluate their assets at the current
market (replacement) cost. Thus, the residual replacement cost (net of wear
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and tear) is determined as the product of the overall replacement cost after
revaluation and the ratio of its residual cost before revaluation to the balance
cost before revaluation according to the accounting data. So, the impact of
the revaluation mechanism can be relatively complex. On the one hand, it
can lead to an increase in the depreciation deduction and thus to a decrease
in the tax base; on the other hand, it can increase the value of the residual
cost, i.e. it can increase the property tax.
The methodological basis of our study consists in two models. The first model
describes behavior of an investor in the Russian fiscal environment, taking into
account factors of risk and uncertainty. The second model presents selection
of a depreciation mechanism providing for the maximum fiscal revenues into
the regional budget from created enterprises.
Let us describe now the above-mentioned models at the qualitative level.
Consider an investment project that assumes the creation of a new enterprise
(firm) in a certain region. The technological description of the investment
project can be represented as a temporal sequence of expenditures and out-
puts in physical units. Prices for resources and outputs products fluctuate
stochastically depending on the situation on the market. Thus, by observing
the prices of input and output production and knowing the technological de-
scription of the project, one can calculate, for any moment of time, income
and production costs before the creation of the firm. The creation requires a
certain amount of various resources in physical units. Since market prices of
the required resources change randomly, the monetary amount of necessary
investment can be considered as a stochastic process. We shall assume that
these investments are instantaneous and irreversible, which means that the
firm starts its production right after the investment has been made, and the
investment cannot be withdrawn and re-allocated for other purposes.
According to these assumptions, cash flows which are connected to profits
and costs of production appear at the moment of investment. In accordance
with Article 253 of TC RF, the above costs are subdivided into material costs,
payroll, depreciation and other costs. According to Article 264 of TC RF,
payments to social funds (unified social tax) and enterprise property tax, whose
tax base depends on the depreciation and accounting policy of the project, will
be referred as other costs. The above incomes and costs represent the base
for calculation of the profit tax which consecutively depends on the project
depreciation policy. Thus, all the firm’s cash flows, defined from the moment
of investment, are random processes since the market prices are stochastic.
The behavior of a potential investor is assumed to be rational in the sense that
he can either make a decision to invest in the project or delay it for some time
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until the situation becomes more favorable. When making this decision, the
investor takes into account, apart from cash flows, various potential adverse
events, which may occur after the firm’s creation such as the partial loss
property and/or profit1.
Thus, at any given moment, the investor can calculate the net present value
of the firm, given current market prices and a forecast of future cash flows.
Investor chooses the optimal moment for investment in order to maximize NPV
of the project, basing on the information about the market prices observable
at any moment of time. Such rule determines the investor’s behavior.
The main problem that arises here and requires investigation at the model
level is the influence of the tax mechanism on the investor behavior under
the conditions of risk and uncertainty. Special attention will be paid to the
mechanism of depreciation. For example, how does accelerated depreciation
affect the investor behavior under the condition of simultaneous usage of tax
holidays? This question is especially pertinent for newly created enterprises
since tax holidays represent the principal fiscal exemption in most countries.
With tax reform still being implemented, the study of some innovations in the
tax legislation is of great interest. First of all, it is interesting to compare the
new system of corporate income taxation with the former system at model
level. In other words, that is to compare the former system with tax holidays
for newly created enterprises and the mechanism of accelerated depreciation
to the new system without these exemptions, but with a lower profit tax rate.
Numerous economists (see, e.g., the monograph Problems of Tax System in
Russia ..., 2000) propose to introduce the real estate tax. Similar law exists in
the majority of countries with developed market economies and, as believed
by the authors of the above-mentioned monograph, it should substitute for
the three laws existing in the Russian tax system: the property tax charged to
enterprises, the property tax charged to the physical persons and the land tax.
The draft law benefits from substantial support from the bodies of legislative
and executive authority. The Federal law “On the experiment with taxation of
the real estate in Great Novgorod and Tver cities in 1997-2000”, which was
accepted in 20.06.97, shows the importance attached to this project by the
government2. The model developed in the present paper is amended in order
to analyze the influence which the substitution of the real estate tax for the
property and land taxes will have on the investor behavior.
The following questions reflected in the paper cover a problem of risk com-
pensation through the tax mechanisms. To explain this, we shall consider the
1 A sequence of such losses we will referred to as risk process
2 This experiment was extended to the year 2003 by a decision of the State Duma Law
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following hypothetical scheme. Let’s assume that the investor, acting accord-
ing to the above model, faces a dilemma: whether to invest in an economy
with a significant risk but with benefits from tax incentives, or in an economy
that has neither the risk nor the incentives. The question of risk compensa-
tion can thus be formulated as follows. Are there, in an economy facing great
risks, such tax incentives for which the investor’s NPV equals or exceeds the
same amount for similar projects in an economy without risk? In the present
paper two tax mechanisms will be considered as such incentives: change in
profit tax rate and depreciation policy.
Let us return to the problem of investment incentives with the help of fis-
cal stimulus. Let us consider the problem from a regional point of view.
Suppose that the region is interested in the completion of certain invest-
ment projects (creation of new enterprises). The absence of such enterprises
can be hazardous for the region which is forced to find elsewhere what the
enterprise can produce locally and has to carry the burden of unemploy-
ment. The implantation of enterprise can increase tax revenues in the re-
gional budget. In the 2001, the Law on Budget, corporate profit tax (for its
regional part), personal income tax and property tax were maintained in the
regional budget3.
Schematically, before the firm is created (before the moment of investment),
there is a flow of losses in the regional budget due to absence of the firm.
And after the investment has been made, a tax flow emerges into the regional
budget, connected with the firm’s activity.
Let us suppose that the region owns some mechanisms (of fiscal nature), with
the help of which it can influence the investor’s arrival. Among these mecha-
nisms can be quoted: the decrease of tax base by the choice of corresponding
depreciation policy, tax holidays and tax credits. Let us underline that such
exemptions are assigned to a project and not to a concrete investor (which
could be directly linked to corruption). The information on such a project
(with corresponding exemptions) is presented for potential investors.
Until recently the mechanism of accelerated depreciation for the active part of
assets was used as one of the incentives tools for attraction of investment in
the Russian regions. The calculation method for accelerated depreciation was
linear. For this method, the “acceleration rate” could not exceed 2. A further
increase of this rate was still possible but had to be approved by the local fiscal
authorities. Even if the mechanism of accelerated depreciation played a great
role in the improvement of investment climate, it is not stipulated anymore
(in a way presented above) in the new legislation (Chapter 25 of TC RF).
3 Local taxes will be considered as federal in the context of this paper
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Tax holidays was another regional mechanism of investments stimulation for
new enterprises. The new enterprise was exempted from the profit tax during
the payback period, but not exceeding a period of three years. Tax holidays
are also not stipulated any more in the new TC RF.
However, the study of possible above mentioned fiscal mechanisms for an
investment incentive purpose at a model level is, in our opinion, not only of
theoretical interest but also of great practical one.
The present report, which consists of five chapters and mathematical appendix,
is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature directly related to the subject of
our study.
Chapter 3 considers the general model of the investor’s behavior in Russian tax
environment under risk and uncertainty. The model includes the description
of the cash flows structure in continuous time, main hypotheses about the
investor’s behavior, reduction of the problem of finding the optimal moment
for investment to an optimal stopping problem for stochastic process.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the investigation of the investor’s behavior model
and considers the main assumptions concerning stochastic dynamics of the
firm’s cash flows, risk process and mechanism of assets revaluation. These as-
sumptions have provided us with the explicit formulas for investor’s NPV and
tax payments into the federal and regional budgets. The main result of this
chapter is the comprehensive decision of the investor’s problem (Section 4.3),
obtained as the rule which determines the optimal moment for investment.
Dependence of this rule on the principal exogenous variables (tax rates, de-
preciation policy, tax holidays, parameters of the investment project, discount
rate, risk and uncertainty factors) is described.
On the basis of these results the authors obtain the explicit formulas that allow
to derive expected NPV of the investor as well as expected tax payments into
the federal and regional budgets given the optimal behavior of the investor.
The final section of this chapter is dedicated to the study of mutual influence
of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation on investor’s behavior. The con-
ditions under which the mutual usage of both mechanisms implies a decrease
in the investment activity (later investment) are presented.
Chapter 5 proposes an optimization approach to the problem of fiscal stimu-
lation. This approach allows to obtain explicitly a depreciation policy which
provides maximum tax revenues in the regional budget. The chapter also
analyzes the problem taking into account the restrictions upon the choice of
optimal depreciation.
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Chapter 6 presents the different capabilities of the models previously con-
structed in preceding chapters for the analysis of the Russian fiscal environ-
ment. Thus, a comparative analysis of the former system of corporate taxation
and the new one is presented in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, the replacement
of property tax by the real estate tax (the model of Novgorod–Tver experi-
ment) at a modeling level is studied. Section 6.3 is devoted to the problem of
risk compensation by means of profit tax rate reduction and changes of tax
base through the depreciation mechanism. At this stage we answer the fol-
lowing question: whether exist such zones of risk (for each mechanism) which
cannot be compensated by any changes in these mechanisms (in tax rate or
in depreciation policy). In Section 6.4 the “converting relation” between the
depreciation rates for the linear and non-linear methods was derived which pro-
vides for identical influence of depreciation policy on optimal investment rule
and related indicators. The final part of this chapter studies two schemes of
losses carry forward in tax payments. One of them is commonly used under the
provision of Article 283 of TC RF. The modeling of this scheme results in insu-
perable difficulties in obtaining the explicit formulas. The second is an approx-
imate scheme. It is used in the model and allows us to obtain explicit formulas.
Then we evaluate the rate of approximation of the first scheme by the second
one according to the criterion of the expected net present value of the firm.
Chapter 7 (Mathematical appendix) is devoted to the description of a new
approach to solving an optimal stopping problem for multidimensional diffu-
sion processes. This approach is based on an intimate connection between the
boundary problem for diffusion processes and the Dirichlet problem for the par-
tial differential equations of an elliptic type. The solution of Dirichlet problem
is considered as a functional of the continuation region. The optimization of
this functional on the set of all available continuation regions will be carried
out by variational methods. The approach described is applied to the solving
of an optimal stopping problem for a two-dimensional geometric Brownian
motion with objective functional, which is an expectation of homogeneous (of
any non-negative degree) function of the process at the stopping moment.
The problem of finding the optimal moment for investment is reduced to a
problem of such a type.
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2. THE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
There is a large quantity of publications devoted to the stimulation of invest-
ment using fiscal methods. For this reason, we will focus our attention solely
on studies which are directly related to the subject of our research. Partic-
ularly, we won’t refer to papers that study the influence of aggregated tax
incentives on macroeconomic variables of investment activity (detailed em-
pirical analysis of efficiency of the aggregated sub-federal tax incentives for
attraction of investments was carried out in EERC framework by Kolomak,
2000) or tax competition of regions to attract investments (a survey of this
subjects can be found, for example, in Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996).
Studies that deal with the influence of the tax exemptions on firms activity
are much closer to our question though, in general, they consider an already
established firm. So, Aukutsionek and Batyaeva (2001) conducted a study of
the influence of taxation on the financial and economic state of an enterprise.
Their study is based upon monitoring data of Russian enterprises within the
Russian Economic Barometer program.
A considerable number of papers deals with the problem of choice of depre-
ciation policy and its influence on the activity of the enterprises. Although
accounting documents define strict rules for a depreciation policy, in many
cases there remains a certain degree of freedom in the choice of both rate and
method of depreciation. In papers by (Roemmich et al., 1978; Berg et al.,
2001) minimization of the present tax payment values by choosing a particular
depreciation policy has been studied. This choice may be significantly affected
by the stochastic nature of future cash flows. In this respect, there are re-
markable papers by Berg and Moore (1989); Berg et al. (1996), in which the
present values of future tax payments of the firm (within the progressive tax
scale) are compared for two methods of depreciation, straight-line (in equal
parts) and “accelerated” (in non-equal parts, decreasing in time). Although
the “accelerated depreciation” might seem a priori the most favorable (due
to discount effect), the optimal choice of depreciation method may in fact
depend on the degree of uncertainty of cash flows, discount rate, fiscal reg-
ulations, and the possibility of transferring the losses onto other periods of
time. Wakeman (1980) has shown that if the tax rate is flat and if taxable
income is non-negative in all periods for all available depreciation methods,
the accelerated depreciation method is most preferable for tax purposes. This
is a consequence of the fact that a more accelerated method typically shifts
taxable income to later periods, and when future money is discounted, paying
taxes later is preferable to paying them now. Wilhouwer et al. (2001) consider
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a similar situation but allow for uncertainty in future cash flows as well as a
progressive tax structure. It is shown that a less accelerated method can then
be optimal. Sansing (1998), Wilhouwer et al. (1999) studied the influence of
tax depreciation and technical depreciation on investment activity.
The starting point of this paper’s model (the investor’s behavior under uncer-
tainty), is the McDonald- Siegel model (McDonald and Siegel, 1986), which
is the basis for the well-known real options theory. Several monographs, for
example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis (1996) are devoted to this sub-
ject. This model studies the behavior of the investor, whose present value
after making investment in the project is described by a stochastic process
(usually a geometric Brownian motion), and investments are considered to
be irreversible. The goal is to find the optimal (according to NPV criterion)
moment for investment, which is considered as the optimal stopping time in
the observation of present value.
The real options theory is represented as the “handy” and adequate tool for
modeling process of creation of new firm. However there are only a few studies
dealing with the influence of tax system on investor’s behavior within this
framework. MacKie-Mason (1990) studied the interaction of uncertainty and
non-linear tax boundaries for projects in the mining industry. It was shown,
that a certain combination of profits uncertainty and non-linear profit tax can
result in unexpected effects (growth of tax rate can encourage investment, and
the increase of deductions from the total profit can discourage investment).
Forsfalt (1999) on the basis of the “real options” approach to the creation
of small firms compared various tax systems of Nordic style. In particular, it
was shown that the comprehensive income tax system (where all incomes are
taxed regardless of their source) yields a higher threshold for creating a firm
than the “dual” system (where incomes are separated with respect to the type
of income).
With reference to the Russian system of profit taxation the investment waiting
model, which is a development of McDonald-Siegel model, was proposed by
Arkin and Slastnikov (1997). The extension of this model by the introduction
of a lag period between the moment of investment and production was studied
by Arkina and Slastnikov (1999). Under the assumption of time-independent
amount of investment the optimal rule for investment was obtained in an an-
alytical form depending on the parameters of the model (characteristics of the
investment project, discount rate, profit taxation system). Explicit relation-
ships of certain indices of investment activity such as the expected time of
investment waiting, the probability of investing in the project, the expected
tax payments into the federal and regional budgets, which all depend on the
above mentioned parameters were analyzed (Arkin et al., 1999b).
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Recently, participants of the project started to incorporate the depreciation
method into the investment waiting model. In Arkin and Slastnikov (2000a),
formulas for the optimal rule for investment with explicit accounting for the de-
preciation policy and tax holidays were obtained. The “optimal” depreciation
policy, which maximizes the present tax payments from the investment project
has been found in Arkin and Slastnikov (2000b). Numeric calculations of the
optimal depreciation rates for the current methods with additional restrictions
have been carried out using adjusted real data.
The paper by Arkin and Slastnikov (2001) is devoted to the analysis of new
effects arising under combined use of accelerated depreciation and tax hol-
idays. It has been shown that under certain conditions an increase of tax
holidays leads to later investment moment, thus decreasing investment activ-
ity. A similar effect has been discovered by Abel (1980), Mintz (1990) using
a different model. On the other hand, introducing accelerated depreciation
does not always stimulate the investor in the presence of tax holidays.
Investigation of the model of regional stimulation on the basis of the invest-
ment waiting model has been started by Arkin et al. (1999a). Tax holidays,
exempting the investor from paying the regional part of the corporate profit
tax, were considered as a stimulation mechanism. The principle of determina-
tion of the “optimal” tax holidays, when the expected present tax payments
from the firm into the regional budget is maximized, has been introduced.
The area of parameters of the model was specified, in which an increase of
tax holidays is favorable both to the investor and to the regional and fed-
eral authorities, since it provides an increase of their incomes (area of mutual
benefits). In addition, we have compared the proposed “optimal” principle of
determination of tax holidays with the methods currently in use in Russian
regions, namely the payback period principle and fixed (within a given region)
tax holidays, usually 3-5 years.
It is worth noting that all of the above-mentioned papers assume the profit
of the firm to be positive, consider only the profit taxation, and consider the
amount of investments required to create the firm to be time-independent.
The latter assumption prohibits the inclusion in the model of such an impor-
tant element of depreciation policy as revaluation of assets. Additionally the
depreciation of assets is directly connected with their residual cost, and there-
fore with the corporate property tax, which has not been considered at all in
the papers cited above. The statements specified above considerably restrict
the field of problems under consideration and the application of obtained re-
sults. The construction of a model of investor’s behavior, freed of statements
specified above, is one of the problems of the present work.
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3. DESCRIPTION OF THE BASIC MODEL
In this Chapter a general model of investor behavior in Russian fiscal envi-
ronment under risk and uncertainty will be described. The basic result of the
study of this model will be the obtaining (in Chapter 4) in an explicit (ana-
lytical) formula of the dependence of optimal investment moment (rule) on
parameters of the investment project and economic environment.
As object of investment, a project for the creation of a new industrial enterprise
(firm) in a certain region will be considered, producing certain goods and
consuming certain resources. Investments necessary for the project (of creation
and start of the new firm), are considered to be instantaneous and irreversible
so that they cannot be withdrawn from the project any more and used for
other purposes (sunk cost).
An important feature of considered model will be the assumption that, at
any moment, the investor can either accept the project and start with the
investment or delay the decision until he obtains new information about its
environment (prices of the product and resources, demand etc.).
3.1. Cash flows structure
Let us suppose that investment in the project starts at moment τ .
Let gross income from the firm at time t ≥ τ be Xτt , and production cost at
time t be Cτt = Y
τ
t + S
τ
t +D
τ
t +M
τ
t , where Y
τ
t is material cost (including
cost of raw materials, etc.), Sτt is payroll cost, D
τ
t is depreciation charges
at this moment, Mτt – other costs, in which are included enterprise property
tax (assets tax) P τt and social funds payments γsS
τ
t (at the rate γs), i.e.
Mτt = P
τ
t + γsS
τ
t
4.
Tax base for the calculation of profit tax is
Zτt = X
τ
t − Cτt = piτt − Sτt −Dτt −Mτt 5, (3.1)
where piτt = Xτt − Y τt is value added6.
Let us define the tax rates, which will be used later on.
4 The gross income Xτt and the material costs Y
τ
t are considered VAT excluded
5 In fact in case of losses, i.e. when costs exceed income this is not necessarily right. The
peculiar problem of losses will be treated in Section 6
6 Sometimes by value added cost it is meant the difference between income and material
costs taking into account VAT
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γi is the enterprise profit tax rate, consisting on the rate into the federal
budget γfi and the rate into the regional budget
7 γri .
γp is the enterprise property tax (assets tax) rate.
γva is the VAT rate, which is splitted
8 into the federal γfva and the regional
γrva parts.
γs is the payroll tax rate which is, as well, splitted into the federal γ
f
s and the
regional γrs parts.
γpi is the personal income tax rate, splitting into the federal γ
f
pi and the
regional γrpi parts.
The total taxes, paid by the firm at moment t, are equal to
γvapi
τ
t + γi(pi
τ
t − Sτt −Dτt −Mτt ) + P τt + γsSτt .
The payments into the federal budget are
γfvapi
τ
t + γ
f
i (pi
τ
t − Sτt −Dτt −Mτt ) + (γfs + γfpi)Sτt , (3.2)
and into the regional budget are
γrvapi
τ
t + γ
r
i (pi
τ
t − Sτt −Dτt −Mτt ) + P τt + (γrs + γrpi)Sτt . (3.3)
(the personal income taxes from the firm’s employees are included).
After-tax cash flow of the firm at the moment t is equal to
Xτt −Y τt −Sτt −Mτt −γi(Xτt −Cτt ) = (1−γi)(piτt −Sτt −Mτt )+γiDτt . (3.4)
3.2. Assets evaluation, depreciation,
enterprise property tax
In our model, the base for depreciation charges and connected taxes will be
the balance cost of assets. Let Iτt be the balance cost of assets at the moment
t provided the firm is created at the moment τ . Index τ emphasizes in the
model, that the cost of assets (which practically is the same as the cost of
required investments) depends on the moment of investment. Dependence of
Iτt on current moment of time t means, that the initial cost of assets after
investment can be revaluate (for example, by replacement cost) in accordance
with current economic situation. Let us point out the two most important
7 Under “regional budget” we will consider sub-federal plus local budget
8 Coefficients of “splitting” are determined annually in the federal budget law
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cases: the case Iτt = Iτ corresponds to the absence of assets revaluation (after
the investment), and Iτt = It can be interpreted as “continuous” revaluation
(assets are permanently revaluate according to current market prices).
As it was already mentioned, in accordance with TC RF, all depreciated assets
are divided into 10 groups depending on their useful lifetime (from 1 year up
to 30 years and higher). Within the framework of our model we divide all
assets into two aggregated parts: one of them (we will call it an “active”
part) refers to machinery, tools, equipment etc. (its share in balance cost of
all assets will be denoted as ψ, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1); and the other (“inactive” part)
refers to buildings and structures, which useful lifetime is long enough.
Depreciation charges at the moment of time t for the project started at the
moment τ will be:
Dτt = ψI
τ
t at−τ + (1− ψ)Iτt bt−τ , t ≥ τ (3.5)
where Iτt is the balance cost of all assets, ψ is the share of active part,
(at, t ≥ 0), (bt, t ≥ 0) are the “densities” of depreciation of active and
inactive parts of assets such that:
at, bt ≥ 0,
∞∫
0
at dt =
∞∫
0
bt dt = 1.
Such scheme covers various depreciation methods (more exactly, their variants
in continuous time), accepted by modern tax laws. The TC RF allows two
methods of this type. With the linear method (SL) the depreciation is charged
by equal shares during all useful lifetime. The corresponding density is:
at =
{
λ, if 0 ≤ t ≤ L
0, if t > L,
(3.6)
where L is a duration of the useful lifetime, and λ = 1/L.
According to the non-linear method (DB) the charged depreciation at each
moment of time is defined as a product of the fixed rate by the residual cost
of asset. One can show, that this method can be described by exponential
density with rate η > 0
at = ηe−ηt. (3.7)
The depreciation influences tax bases of two taxes: the profit tax (see (3.1))
and the property tax (assets tax), the later will be considered in detail. Since
tax base for this case is the residual cost of assets we can present assets tax
within the framework of our model as
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P τt = γpI
τ
t [1− ψât−τ − (1− ψ)̂bt−τ ], t ≥ τ (3.8)
where
âθ =
θ∫
0
as ds, b̂t =
θ∫
0
bs ds (3.9)
are accumulated shares of depreciation (at balance cost) for, respectively,
active and inactive part of assets during the period θ after investment.
Let us describe briefly the experiment on the real estate taxation, which began
in 1997 in Tver and Novgorod and was prolonged for three years from 2000.
The main idea of this experiment is to replace several property taxes such
as enterprise property tax, physical persons property tax and land tax by the
single real estate tax. The base of this tax is the market price of the real
estate. Land is also an object of taxation, that is why cost of any real estate
object includes a land component.
In our model real estate is linked to the inactive part of assets (plus land
where they are located). Therefore, within the framework of Novgorod–Tver
experiment the enterprise property tax can be approximately replaced by
P˜ τt ≈ γ˜p(1− ψ)It,
where γ˜p is the real estate tax rate, and (1 − ψ)It is a cost of the inactive
part of assets calculated at the current market prices9. In other words, the
tax base for the enterprise property tax is not the residual cost of assets but
its full replacement cost. We come back to the discussion of this experiment
at the model level in Chapter 6.
3.3. Uncertainty and risk. Investment timing
Let investment in the project start at the moment τ , and Iτ be the amount
of required investment.
Since economic environment can be subject to various random factors influ-
ence (uncertainty in market prices, demand etc.), we will consider the amount
of required investment (It, t ≥ 0) as a random process, and value added
(piτt , t ≥ τ, τ ≥ 0) will be described as a family of random processes given on
some probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) with a flow of σ-fields (Ft, t ≥ 0).
Ft can be interpreted as the observable information about the system up to
the moment of time t. It and pi
τ
t are assumed to be Ft-measurable.
9 Land cost here is not included, because methods for its evaluation are not developed yet
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Let (ζτt , t ≥ τ, τ ≥ 0), 0 ≤ ζτt ≤ 1 be the risk process acting on after-tax
cash flow of the investor. This risk process is connected with the loss of a
share of the investor’s net profit at random moments of time after investing.
As we mentioned in Introduction, according to new TC RF the regional author-
ities can reduce (in certain limits) profit tax rate in its regional part (Article
284). Let ν be the length of the interval of time (after creation of the firm),
during which lower regional profit tax rate γ0i is applicable
10, and γ¯i = γ
f
i +γ
0
i
is lower profit tax rate, which is charged to the investor.
For simplicity we assume that the firm earns profit right after the investment
is made. Then, according to (3.4), the present value of investor (discounted
to the moment of investment) can be expressed as the following formula
Vτ = E
 τ+ν∫
τ
ζτt [(1− γ¯i)(piτt − Sτt −Mτt ) + γ¯iDτt ]e−ρ(t−τ) dt
+
∞∫
τ+ν
ζτt [(1− γi)(piτt − Sτt −Mτt ) + γiDτt ]e−ρ(t−τ) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
 , (3.10)
where ρ is discount rate, and E(·|Fτ ) stands for the conditional expectation
provided by information about the system up to the moment τ .
The behavior of the investor is assumed to be rational in the sense that he
chooses the moment of investment τ (investment rule), in order to maximize
his expected net present value (NPV):
E (Vτ − Iτ ) e−ρτ → max
τ
, (3.11)
where the maximum is considered over all Markov moments τ .
Simultaneously to NPV, it is possible to calculate, using formulas (3.2) and
(3.3), the present tax payments from the firm into the budgets. The expected
present tax payments from the firm into the federal budget, discounted to
moment τ are equal to:
T fτ = E
 ∞∫
τ
[γfvapi
τ
t+γ
f
i (pi
τ
t −Sτt −Dτt−Mτt )+γ˜fs Sτt ]e−ρ(t−τ) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
 ,
(3.12)
and into the regional budget –
10 This period is usually called tax holidays, though this term is absent in modern tax laws
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T rτ =E
 τ+ν∫
τ
[γrvapi
τ
t +γ
0
i (pi
τ
t −Sτt −Dτt−Mτt )+P τt +γ˜rsSτt ]e−ρ(t−τ)dt
+
∞∫
τ+ν
[γrvapi
τ
t+γ
r
i (pi
τ
t−Sτt −Dτt−Mτt )+P τt +γ˜rsSτt ]e−ρ(t−τ)dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
 , (3.13)
where γ˜fs = γ
f
s + γ
f
pi, γ˜
r
s = γ
r
s + γ
r
pi.
Another interesting indicator is the expected present tax burden Bτ for the
created firm which is defined as a ratio of expected present tax payments from
the firm to expected present value added, i.e.
Bτ =E
 ∞∫
τ
[γvapiτt + γ
f
s S
τ
t ]e
−ρ(t−τ) dt+
τ+ν∫
τ
γ¯iZ
τ
t e
−ρ(t−τ) dt
+
∞∫
τ+ν
γiZ
τ
t e
−ρ(t−τ) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
/E
 ∞∫
τ
piτt e
−ρ(t−τ) dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣Fτ
 , (3.14)
where tax base Zτt is defined in (3.1).
4. SOLUTION OF THE INVESTOR PROBLEM
In this Chapter we provide a solution for the investor problem which as it
turned out can be obtained in an explicit (analytical) form. On the basis
of the obtained formulas we will carry out a theoretical analysis as well as
numeric calculations.
4.1. Main assumptions
The amount of required investment It is described by geometric Brownian
motion
It = I0 +
t∫
0
Is(α1 ds+ σ1 dw1s), t ≥ 0, (4.1)
where (w1t , t ≥ 0) is a Wiener process, α1 and σ1 are real numbers (σ1 ≥ 0),
and I0 is a given initial state of the process.
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The dynamics of value added piτt , t ≥ τ is specified by a family of stochastic
equations
piτt = piτ +
t∫
τ
piτs (α2 ds+ σ2 dw
2
s), t ≥ τ, (4.2)
where piτ is Fτ -measurable random variable, (w2t , t ≥ 0) is a Wiener process,
α2 and σ2 are real numbers (σ2 ≥ 0).
The pair (w1t , w2t ) is two-dimensional Wiener process with correlation r, i.e.
E(w1tw
2
t ) = rt for all t ≥ 0.
We assume that at any moment τ , observing the current prices on both input
and output production one can calculate piτ = piττ , which is the difference
between incomes and material costs at the investment moment, i.e. value
added at the “initial moment” of creation of firm, and, hence, can evaluate the
future profits from the project before the actual creation of the firm. For these
reasons we will refer to (pit, t ≥ 0) as “virtual” value added of the project.
Knowing the information about virtual value added of the project as well as
about the amount of required investment, investor can calculate (by formula
(3.10)) an expected net present value of the project provided the investment
would be made at that (considered) moment. Thus, we guess that investor
makes a decision about investing in the project on the ground of observations
on two-dimensional stochastic process ((pit, It), t ≥ 0). Therefore, without
loss of generality, we consider that σ-field Ft is generated by the values of this
two-dimensional process up to the moment t, i.e. Ft = σ(pis, Is; 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
We suppose that the process of virtual value added (pit, t ≥ 0) is subject to
the stochastic equation
pit = pi0 +
t∫
0
pis(α2 ds+ σ2 dw2s), t ≥ 0, (4.3)
with given initial state pi0.
As one can see from the above formulas, a process of geometric Brownian mo-
tion (that is non-negative process) is the basis for the description of dynamics
of both value added and amount of required investments. Such an hypothesis
is typical for many financial models including known real options theory (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996), and follows from a general assumptions
about stochastic processes like independence, homogeneity, continuity (see,
for example, Arkin et al., 1999a). The parameters of the geometric Brown-
ian motion have a natural economic interpretation: the drift coefficient (at
dt) is an expected instantaneous rate of process changes; and the diffusion
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coefficient (at dwit) is an instantaneous variance of process changes (volatil-
ity). Thus, this process can be viewed as an approximation for the relevant
actual processes.
As risk process (ζτt , t ≥ τ, τ ≥ 0) we will consider the random processes
(with jumps) of the following type
ζτt =
Nτt∏
j=1
(1− ξj),
where 0 ≤ ξj ≤ 1 are shares of losses in after-tax investor’s profit, and
Nτt is a number of adverse events (moments of losses) appeared at the
interval [τ, t].
Shares of losses ξj , j = 1, 2, . . . are assumed to be identically distributed and
independent (mutually and on Wiener process (w2t , t ≥ 0)) random variables.
The intervals between the adverse events are independent and exponentially
distributed (with parameter ²) random variables. These assumptions imply
that a number of adverse events Nτt = Nt−τ , (Ns, s ≥ 0) is Poison process
with parameter ².
Note, that the parameters of a risk process, namely, the intensity of appearing
of the adverse events ² and the average share of losses Eξj can, in general,
depend on parameters of the project.
The assumptions formulated above reflect such properties of a risk process as
unpredictability of losses both in time and in amount.
As for assets revaluation, we accept the hypothesis that the forecasted balance
cost of assets Iτt will “follow” the dynamics of investments cost It. Namely,
we assume that
E (Iτt | Fτ ) = Iτeθα1(t−τ), 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, (4.4)
where the parameter θ characterizes revaluation mechanism. As follows from
(4.1), the case θ = 0 corresponds to no-revaluation of assets, and the case
θ = 1 corresponds to “continuous” revaluation of assets according their re-
placement value It. If one thinks that revaluation occurs at random times
(subjected to Poison distribution), then parameter θ can be associated with
the intensity of this underlying process.
Share of active part ψ of depreciable assets is fixed.
The payroll fund Sτt is supposed to be proportional to the value added pi
τ
t , i.e.
Sτt = µ˜pi
τ
t ,
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where µ˜ is a given constant. Though such a hypothesis is rather disputed it
is in accord with the principle of a dependence between wages and production
activity. In some sense it is technical because its rejection leads to multi-
dimensional diffusion processes (with dimension greater than 2) that in turn
makes it impossible to obtain explicit (analytical) formulas.
Taking into account this assumption the taxable profit (tax base) (3.1) can
be written as Xτt −Cτt = piτt −Sτt −Dτt −P τt −γsSτt = piτt (1−µ)−Dτt −P τt ,
where µ = (1+γs)µ˜. In order for this tax base not to be negative at all times
we have to require µ < 1, or (1 + γs)µ˜ < 1.
4.2. Derivation of investor’s present value
and present tax payments
Now we can write explicit formulas for the investor’s present value and for
present tax payments into the budgets.
We will denote a conditional expectation provided by Fτ as Eτ .
Begin with the derivation of Eτζτt , t > τ . Taking into account the inde-
pendence of both the variables ξj and Poison process N
τ
t on Wiener process
(w2t ), we have
Eτ ζτt = E
Nτt∏
j=1
(1− ξj) =
∑
n≥0
P{Nτt = n}E
n∏
j=1
(1− ξj)
=
∑
n≥0
²n(t− τ)n
n!
e−²(t−τ)(1− q)n = e−δ(t−τ),
where q = Eξj , δ = ²q is the average share of losses per unit of time.
The known properties of geometric Brownian motion and (4.4) imply:
Eτpiτt = piτe
α2(t−τ),
EτIτt = Iτe
θα1(t−τ),
EτP τt = γpIτ [1− ψât−τ − (1− ψ)̂bt−τ ]eθα1(t−τ),
EτDτt = Iτ [ψat−τ + (1− ψ)bt−τ ]eθα1(t−τ),
Let us accept the following designations:
ρ˜ = ρ+ δ − θα1, At =
∞∫
t
ase
−ρ˜s ds, Bt =
∞∫
t
bse
−ρ˜s ds, (4.5)
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Ât =
∞∫
t
(e−ρ˜t − e−ρ˜s)as ds, B̂t =
∞∫
t
(e−ρ˜t − e−ρ˜s)bs ds. (4.6)
Using (3.9), one can obtain:
∞∫
0
âte
−ρ˜t dt =
∞∫
0
as
∞∫
s
e−ρ˜t dt ds =
1
ρ˜
A0,
∞∫
0
b̂te
−ρ˜t dt =
1
ρ˜
B0,
∞∫
ν
âte
−ρ˜t dt =
∞∫
0
as
∞∫
ν
e−ρ˜t dt ds−
∞∫
ν
as
s∫
ν
e−ρ˜t dt ds =
1
ρ˜
[e−ρ˜ν − Âν ],
∞∫
ν
b̂te
−ρ˜t dt =
1
ρ˜
[e−ρ˜ν − B̂ν ],
τ+ν∫
τ
EτP τt e
−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt =
γp
ρ˜
Iτ [1− ψ(A0 + Âν)− (1− ψ)(B0 + B̂ν)],
∞∫
τ+ν
EτP τt e
−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt =
γp
ρ˜
Iτ [ψÂν + (1− ψ)B̂ν ],
τ+ν∫
τ
EτDτt e
−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt = Iτ [ψ(A0 − Âν) + (1− ψ)(B0 − B̂ν)],
∞∫
τ+ν
EτDτt e
−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt = Iτ [ψAν + (1− ψ)Bν ].
Therefore,
Vτ =
τ+ν∫
τ
{(1− γ¯i)[(1− µ)Eτpiτt −EτP τt ] + γ¯iEτDτt }e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt
+
∞∫
τ+ν
{(1− γi)[(1− µ)Eτpiτt −EτP τt ] + γiEτDτt }e−(ρ+δ)(t−τ) dt
=
(1−µ)(1−γ̂i)
ρ+δ−α2 piτ+Iτ [ψ(γ¯iA0+∆γiAν)+(1−ψ)(γ¯iB0+∆γiBν)]
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− γp
ρ+δ−θα1 Iτ{1−γ¯i−ψ[(1−γ¯i)A0+∆γiÂν ]−(1−ψ)[(1−γ¯i)B0+∆γiB̂ν ]}
=
(1− µ)(1− γ̂i)
ρ+ δ − α2 piτ + Iτ
(
H1 − γp
ρ+ δ − θα1H2
)
, (4.7)
where
∆γi = γri − γ0i , γ̂i = γ¯i +∆γie−(ρ+δ−α2)ν ,
H1 = ψ(γ¯iA0 +∆γiAν) + (1− ψ)(γ¯iB0 +∆γiBν),
H2 = 1− γ¯i − ψ[(1− γ¯i)A0 +∆γiÂν ]− (1− ψ)[(1− γ¯i)B0 +∆γiB̂ν ].
As one can see from formula (4.7) for investor’s present value, the parameters
of risk process ζτt are included in formulas only as addition of the average
share of losses per unit of time δ to discount rate (“risk premium”).
Analogously, one can obtain the following expressions for the present tax pay-
ments (3.12) and (3.13) into the federal and the regional budgets, as well as
the present tax burden (3.14):
T fτ =
γfva + γ
f
i (1− µ) + γ˜fs µ˜
ρ− α2 piτ − γ
f
i Iτ
{
γp
ρ− θα1 +
(
1− γp
ρ− θα1
)
× [ψA00 + (1− ψ)B00]} ,
T rτ =
γrva + (γ
0
i +∆γie
−(ρ−α2)ν)(1− µ) + γ˜rs µ˜
ρ− α2 piτ − Iτ
(
H01 −
γp
ρ− θα1H
0
2
)
,
Bτ = γva + γi(1− µ) + γ˜sµ˜− Iτ (ρ− α2)
piτ
[
γp
ρ− θα1 (1−K0)− γiK0
]
,
where
H01 = ψ(γ
0
iA
0
0 +∆γiA
0
ν) + (1− ψ)(γ0iB00 +∆γiB0ν),
H02 = 1− γ0i − ψ[(1− γ0i )A00 +∆γiÂ0ν ]− (1− ψ)[(1− γ0i )B00 +∆γiB̂0ν ],
K0 = ψA00 + (1− ψ)B00 ,
and values A00, B
0
0 , A
0
ν , B
0
ν are determined similar to (4.5)–(4.6) with the
replacement δ by 0.
Note, that if tax holidays are absent, the above formulas are rather simplified.
So, the investor’s present value will be
Vτ =
(1−µ)(1−γi)
ρ+δ−α2 piτ+Iτ
[(
γi+
γp(1−γi)
ρ+δ−θα1
)
K− γp(1−γi)
ρ+δ−θα1
]
, (4.8)
where K = ψA0 + (1− ψ)B0.
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It is worth noting that under the absence of tax holidays the present value of
the investor and, therefore, his behavior depends only on the present depreci-
ation charges for the all period after investing, i.e. on the expression of the
type
∞∫
0
ate
−ρt dt. We will discuss this fact in details in Chapter 6.
4.3. Optimal moment for investment
The problem faced by the investor is an optimal stopping problem for two-
dimensional stochastic process.
Let β be a positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ˜2β(β − 1) + (α2 − α1)β − (ρ− α1) = 0, (4.9)
σ˜2 = σ21−2rσ1σ2+σ22 be a “total” volatility of investment project. It is easy
to see that β > 1 whenever ρ > α2. If σ˜ > 0, then
β =
1
2
− α2 − α1
σ˜2
+
√(
α2 − α1
σ˜2
− 1
2
)2
+
2(ρ− α1)
σ˜2
.
The following theorem characterizes completely an optimal rule for investing.
Theorem 1. Let the amount of required investments It be described by the
process (4.1), and values added pit by the relation (4.3). Assume that σ˜ > 0
and the following conditions are satisfied:
α2 − 12σ
2
2 ≥ α1 −
1
2
σ21 , ρ > max(α1, α2).
Then the optimal moment for investment is
τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : pit ≥ p∗It}, (4.10)
where p∗ =
(
1−H1 + γp
ρ+ δ − θα1H2
)
· ρ+ δ − α2
(1− µ)(1− γ̂i) ·
β
β − 1 , H1, H2,
and γ̂i are defined in (4.7).
Let us formulate this result for the case when tax holidays are absent.
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Corollary. If ν = 0, then the optimal moment for the investment is
p∗ =
[
1 +
(
γi
1− γi +
γp
ρ+ δ − θα1
)
(1−K)
]
· ρ+ δ − α2
1− µ ·
β
β − 1 ,
where K is defined in (4.8).
This theorem shows that the optimal moment for investment begins when the
ratio of virtual value added to the amount of required investment achieves a
critical level p∗.
One can look at equality (4.10) from another point of view.
As one can see from formula (4.7) for the investor’s present value Vτ , the opti-
mal moment for the investment coincides with the moment when profitability
index of the initial investment Vτ/Iτ achieves threshold level
β
β − 1
(
1−H1 + γp
ρ+ δ − θα1H2
)
+H1 − γp
ρ+ δ − θα1H2.
In order to avoid the trivial moment of investment τ∗ = 0, we will further
suppose that the initial values of the processes satisfy pi0 < p
∗I0.
If we know the optimal moment for investment, we can find the expected
optimal present value for the investor as well as the relevant expected present
tax payments into the budgets at different levels. Let us denote the expected
present value for the investor under the optimal behavior (i.e. maximum value
of the function in (3.11)) as N , let T f = E
(
T fτ∗e
−ρτ∗
)
be the expected
present tax payments into the federal budget under the optimal behavior, and
T r = E
(
T rτ∗e
−ρτ∗
)
be the similar value for tax payments into the regional
budget, B = Bτ∗ be the expected present tax burden under the optimal
behavior of investor. Furthermore, it is also interesting to study the expected
time of investment waiting Eτ∗.
Using Theorem 4 from Chapter 7, we can obtain the following formulas for
these indicators.
Theorem 2. Let the amount of required investments It be described by the
process (4.1), and values added pit by the relation (4.3). Assume that σ˜ > 0,
α2−12σ
2
2≥α1−
1
2
σ21 , and ρ>max(α1, α2). Then, the following formulas hold:
1) N = I0
(
pi0
I0p∗
)β (
1−H1 + γp
ρ+ δ − θα1H2
)
· 1
β − 1 ;
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2) T f = I0
(
pi0
I0p∗
)β {
γfva + γ
f
i (1− µ) + γ˜fs µ˜
ρ− α2 p
∗ − γfi
[
γp
ρ−θα1
+
(
1− γp
ρ− θα1
)
K0
]}
,
3) T r = I0
(
pi0
I0p∗
)β {
γrva + (γ0i +∆γie
−(ρ−α2)ν)(1− µ) + γ˜rs µ˜
ρ− α2 p
∗
−H01 +
γp
ρ− θα1H
0
2
}
;
4) B = γva+γi(1−µ)+γ˜sµ˜−(ρ−α2)
[
γp
ρ−θα1 (1−K0)−γiK0
]
(p∗)−1;
5) Eτ∗ = (α2 − 12σ
2
2 − α1 +
1
2
σ21)
−1 log
(
I0p
∗
pi0
)
;
where p∗ is defined in Theorem 1, and K0 = ψA00 + (1− ψ)B00 .
(See the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Chapter 7.)
4.4. Comparative statics. The mutual influence
of depreciation mechanisms and tax holidays
on investment activity
In the previous Section it was obtained an optimal rule of investment, and on
this base were derived the formulas for the various economic indices related
to given investment project. The main feature of those formulas was the
explicit (analytical) description of the dependence of indices of more than
twenty different parameters.
The dependence of some parameters is simple (for example, the monotonicity).
But the mutual influence of certain parameters can lead to far less obvious
analytical results.
For example, taken separately tax holidays and accelerated depreciation are
fiscal incentives, stimulate investment activity and especially favor the earlier
entry of investor. But, as it will be demonstrated below, the simultaneous ap-
plication of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation can lead (under certain
conditions) to decreasing investment activity. It is related to the fact that, un-
der tax holidays, profit tax is absent and depreciation allowances act in vain11.
11 Some developing countries (e.g. Malaysia, Coˆte d’Ivoire) permits to delay depreciation
allowances until end of tax holidays (see Mintz, 1990)
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In order to investigate such a phenomena let us study the dependence of
optimal investment level p∗ which determines the optimal moment for investor
entry on tax holidays and depreciation.
In order to simplify the formulas we will ignore the property tax which will be
considered as zero (i.e. γp = 0). In this case the optimal level of investment
is the following
p∗ = (1−H1)p˜, where p˜ = ρ+ δ − α2(1− µ)(1− γ̂i) ·
β
β − 1 , (4.11)
γ̂i = γ¯i+∆γie−(ρ+δ−α2)ν , H1 = γ¯i[ψA0+(1−ψ)B0]+∆γi[ψAν+(1−ψ)Bν ],
and A0, Aν , B0, Bν are defined in (4.5).
Thus we have
∂p∗
∂ν
= −p˜ ∂H1
∂ν
+
(1−H1)p˜
1−γ̂i ·
∂γ̂i
∂ν
= p˜∆γie−(ρ+δ−θα1)ν [ψaν+(1−ψ)bν ]
− (1−H1)p˜
1−γ̂i ∆γi(ρ+δ−α2)e
−(ρ+δ−α2)ν
= p˜∆γie−(ρ+δ)ν
[
cνe
θα1ν − β − 1
β
(1− µ)p∗eα2ν
]
,
where cν = ψaν + (1− ψ)bν .
The sign of the derivative
∂p∗
∂ν
is thus defined by the sign of the following
expression
cνe
θα1ν − β − 1
β
(1− µ)p∗eα2ν
or after a multiplication by positive value Iτ∗, by the sign of expression
∆ν = Iτ∗cνeθα1ν − β − 1
β
(1− µ)piτ∗eα2ν
(although this expression is a random variable its sign is not random!).
The last expression have a clear economic interpretation. Let us notice, that
according to formulas (3.5) and (4.5), Iτ∗cνe
θα1ν = E
(
Dτ
∗
τ∗+ν | Fτ∗) is the
forecasting (at moment τ∗) depreciation deduction at the moment τ∗ + ν,
and due to assumption (4.3) piτ∗e
α2ν = E
(
piτ
∗
τ∗+ν | Fτ∗) is the forecasting
(made at moment τ∗) value added at the moment τ∗ + ν.
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Thus, the sign of
∂p∗
∂ν
depends on the relation between the predicted de-
preciation charge and predicted value added at the moment of ending tax
holidays. If the value added prevails over depreciation charge, i.e ∆ν < 0,
then the increase in the duration of tax holidays implies drop in the optimal
investment level, and therefore, the time of investment waiting decreases. In
other words, the increase of tax exemptions in this case stimulates investment
activity. However, if depreciation charge prevails over value added and a con-
trary inequality holds, then we observe a very surprising result: the increase
of the duration of tax holidays implies a later entry of investor (since level p∗
increases), i.e. decrease in investment activity.
Let us illustrate our theoretical arguments by numerical examples.
Since an optimal moment of investment is a random variable, it is convenient
to compare the expected delay in the investment moments for various tax
holidays (for a simplification tax holidays are assumed to be full). Let us
suppose that τ∗ν is the optimal moment of investment when tax holidays equal
ν and ∆τ = Eτ∗0 − Eτ∗ν is the expected speed up of investment when tax
holidays are ν (related to zero tax holidays).
Table 4.1 exposes the results of the calculations of ∆τ for different values of
tax holidays ν and for various shares of active assets ψ in the investment. Has
been considered in this calculation a project of investment with parameters
α2 = 2%, σ2 = 0.1, α1 = σ1 = 0 and discount ρ = 10% (risk is absent). We
chose the non-linear depreciation method with rates 35% ( for active part of
assets) and 3% (for inactive part).
Table 4.1
ν ψ = 0.9 ψ = 0.5
1 -3.2 -1.2
2 -4.6 -1.5
3 -5.1 -1.3
4 -5.1 -0.9
6 -4.2 0.3
The calculations show that when tax holidays increase the delay in the in-
vestment can be significant, particularly when the share of active assets is
sufficiently high. Let us remark that if we choose 10% for depreciation rate
of active assets, then the value ∆τ will already be positive for any ν (even for
ψ = 0.9).
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Figure 1. Dependence of A on the depreciation rate
Let us study now the dependence of p∗ on depreciation rate12. From (4.11)
we have that this dependence can be presented as a superposition of two
functions. The first one is p∗ = p∗(A), where A = γ¯iA0 + ∆γiAν is a
weighted sum of integrated discounted depreciation charges.
The second function defines the dependence of A on the depreciation rate. It
is easy to see that p∗(A) is monotone decreasing function (in A).
As for the second function, for which even in the case of full tax holidays
(γ¯i = 0) and for any authorized depreciation method (linear or non-linear) the
dependence of A on the depreciation rate is non-monotone. One can see the
graph of A as a function of the depreciation rate for both linear (see (3.6))
and non-linear (see (3.7)) methods on Figure 1.
As one can see on those two graphs, A has a maximum in a depreciation rate:
this maximum is attained for the linear method at the point λ0 which is the
root of equation
1 + ρ/λ = eρ/λ−ρν ;
and for the non-linear method at the point η0, which is the root of equation
ρ
ρ+ η
= ην.
Let us notice that with a decrease in tax holidays the points of maximum λ0
and η0 increase and when tax holidays equal zero the intervals of decreasing
are absent, i.e λ0=η0=∞ when ν = 0.
12 We will bound our considerations by a depreciation of active assets only
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Thus, under full tax holidays type of dependence of the investment level p∗ on
depreciation rate significantly depends on the value of depreciation rate itself.
If the rate of depreciation does not exceed a certain “critical” level the increase
in the depreciation rate leads to a decrease in the level p∗ which means that
the investor arrives earlier. And, if depreciation rate is sufficiently high (i.e.
exceeds the critical level) the increase in depreciation leads to a contrary effect
(the increase in the level p∗) which means decreasing in investment activity,
i.e later arrival of the investor.
Consequently, the introduction of accelerated depreciation does not always
stimulate investor under the presence of tax holidays. Moreover, if the rate of
depreciation is high the accelerated depreciation leads to the contrary effect
— a later arrival of investor.
The dependence of A on the depreciation rate in the case of non-full tax
holidays (when γ¯i is non-zero) becomes far more complicated. In that case A
can have several points of local extremum which are the roots for the following
equation:
γ¯iρ+∆γie−(η+ρ)ν [ρ− ην(η + ν)] = 0.
More than two areas of monotonicity appear and the description of the in-
fluence of the depreciation rate upon the investment activity becomes a very
difficult case even at the qualitative level.
5. OPTIMIZATION APPROACH TO REGIONAL
STIMULATION OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS
BY MEANS OF DEPRECIATION MECHANISM
In this Chapter we consider the problem of attraction of investment on the
projects necessary for the region.
The principal hypothesis that we will take into account consists in the fact
that the region, developing the investment project (particularly choosing de-
preciation policy), believes that investor will behave as described in the model
presented above (in Chapter 3). In other words the absence of investment at a
given moment of time (investment waiting) is treated as the optimal investor’s
behavior, who decides to observe the environment and postpones investment
in the project. Knowing the dependence of optimal investment rule on the
parameters of tax system, and particularly on depreciation policy, the region
choose this policy, following its own criteria.
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Despite the fact that the region can be interested in numerous aspects to
the realization of the project, in this Chapter we will consider that the region
only follows a fiscal goals. The optimal depreciation policy will be found
that provides maximal expected tax payments into the regional budget and its
investigation will be conducted.
5.1. Formulation of the regional stimulation problem
Let us now describe the model of stimulation of the investment project at the
regional level.
The base of this model is the hypothesis of rational behavior of the investor
(optimal investment timing in the sense of NPV criteria). Supposing that
the potential investor behaves rationally the region considers the absence of
investment at a given moment of time as the exceeding of optimal threshold
p∗ over the observed ratio pit/It. The optimal threshold p∗ = p∗(D), which is
function of the depreciation policy D, defines, due to Theorem 1, the optimal
moment of investment τ∗ = τ∗(D). Thus for each depreciation policy D
the region is able to define the expected revenues into the regional budget
after the realization of the project (under optimal investor behavior) — see
Theorem 2 in Section 4.3:
T r(D) = I0
(
pi0
I0p∗
)β {
γrva + (γ0i +∆γie
−(ρ−α2)ν)(1− µ) + γrs µ˜
ρ− α2 p
∗
−H01 +
γp
ρ− θα1H
0
2
}
, (5.1)
where H01 = H
0
1 (D), H
0
2 = H
0
2 (D).
Let us suppose (in the present Chapter) that the region, having the possibility
of choice of the depreciation policy for the investment project, follows the
principle of optimality. This means that among the available depreciation
policies (which are available for the region) the region chooses the one that
maximizes expected discounted tax payments into the regional budget from
the created enterprise (5.1). Thus, the problem of stimulation is deducted
to the problem of optimization by the region of the functional T r(D) on a
certain available class of depreciation policies D:
T r(D)→ max
D∈D
. (5.2)
The available classes of depreciation policies D can be defined by different
depreciation methods (linear, non-linear), and the number of additional re-
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strictions. Those restrictions can come, for example, from the competition
between regions in order to “attract” the potential investor and are specified
by lower bound on NPV of the investor. Another type of restrictions can be
linked to the continuous (in average ) supply of tax payments of the enterprise
into the regional budget for any time after investment, i.e. the gross profit
Zτ
∗
t (defined by the formula (3.1)) will be not less (in average) than a given
level. Investigation of similar problems (with restrictions on expected gross
profits) was started in Arkin and Slastnikov (2000b).
5.2. Optimal depreciation policy
In this Section we find an optimal depreciation policy (depreciation density)
that provides maximal expected present tax payments from the project into the
regional budget. Since changing in depreciation method and rates is allowed as
a rule for active part of assets only, we will identify a depreciation policy with
a depreciation density of active part of assets (at, t ≥ 0). The depreciation
density of inactive assets (bt, t ≥ 0) will be considered as fixed.
Let D be a given set of all available (for the regional control) depreciation
policies D. For any depreciation policy D = (at, t ≥ 0) one can define the
integral from discounted depreciation density
A = A(D) =
∞∫
0
ate
−(ρ−θα1)t dt,
similar as in previous Sections.
Let us denote
min
D∈D
A(D) = A, max
D∈D
A(D) = A¯. 13
We assume that the set of available depreciation policies is enough “rich” in
the following sense.
(C) For any value a, A < a < A¯ there exists depreciation policy D ∈ D
such that A(D) = a. 14
In other words, set {a : a = A(D), D ∈ D} will be the interval [A, A¯].
In order to obtain explicit formulas for optimal depreciation policy we will
assume that both tax holidays and risk process are absent, i.e. ν = 0 and
13 If min and/or max are not attained for some sets D, one can say about inf and/or sup
14 It is valid, e.g., if set D consists of uniform or exponential densities
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δ = 0. In this case the expression for present tax payments (5.1) can be
written as follows:
T r(D) = I0
(
pi0
I0p˜
)β
(1− u)−β [qr(1− u)− h1u+ h2], (5.3)
where u=u(D)=(γi+Γ)K−Γ, Γ=γp(1−γi)
ρ−θα1 , K=K(D)=ψA(D)+(1−ψ)B,
qr =
γrva + γri (1− µ) + γ˜rs µ˜
(1− µ)(1− γi) ·
β
β − 1 , B =
∞∫
0
bte
−(ρ−θα1)t dt,
h1 =
γri + Γ
r
γi + Γ
, h2 =
γiΓr − γri Γ
γi + Γ
, Γr =
γp(1− γri )
ρ− θα1 .
Thus the problem of finding an optimal depreciation policy by the region (5.2)
is reduced (due to formula (5.3)) to a more simple problem of maximization
of a function at some interval, namely,
g(u)→ max
u≤u≤u¯
, (5.4)
where g(u) = (1− u)−β [qr(1− u)− h1u+ h2],
u = (γi + Γ)[ψA+ (1− ψ)B]− Γ, u¯ = (γi + Γ)[ψA¯+ (1− ψ)B]− Γ.
Differentiating g(u) we have:
g′(u) = β(1− u)−β−1[qr(1−u)−h1u+h2]−(1−u)−β(qr+h1)
= (1− u)−β−1G(u), (5.5)
where G(u) = β [qr(1− u)− h1u+ h2]− (1− u) (qr + h1)
= (β − 1)qr(1− u)− βh1u− (1− u)h1 + βh2
= (βQ− h1)(1− u)− βh1u+ βh2, (5.6)
and Q = qr
β − 1
β
=
γrva + γ
r
i (1− µ) + γ˜rs µ˜
(1− µ)(1− γi) .
G(u) is decreasing function since G′(u) = −βQ− (β − 1)h1 < 0.
Let us pass to solving the maximization problem (5.4). Let u∗ denote an
optimal solution in (5.4).
If G(u) ≤ 0 then G(u) ≤ 0 whenever u > u, and due to (5.5) g(u) de-
creases in u, therefore u∗ = u, hence optimal depreciation policy D∗ satisfies
A(D∗) = A. Formula (5.6) implies that condition G(u) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
β[Q− (Q+ h1)u+ h2] ≤ (1− u)h1. (5.7)
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Similarly one can obtain that G(u) > 0 whenever u ≤ u¯ is equivalent to
β[Q− (Q+ h1)u¯+ h2] ≥ (1− u¯)h1. (5.8)
Hence, in this case g(u) increases in u, and therefore, u∗ = u¯.
If both inequalities (5.7) and (5.8) are not held, then g(u) attains maximum
at the point u∗ such that G(u∗) = 0, and
u∗ =
βQ− h1 + βh2
βQ+ βh1 − h1 . (5.9)
Collect the above results we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let condition (C) holds. Then depreciation policy D∗ =
(a∗t , t ≥ 0) is optimal if and only if the discounted depreciation density
A∗ =
∞∫
0
a∗t e
−(ρ−θα1)t dt satisfies the following relations:
A∗ =

A, if (5.7) holds
A¯, if (5.8) holds[
u∗ + Γ
γi + Γ
− (1− ψ)B
]
/ψ, else
where u∗ is defined in (5.9).
Now we give the relevant results for the major classes of depreciation methods,
specified in Section 3.2.
For the linear method with depreciation rate λ (see (3.6)) we have
A = ASL(λ) =
λ
ρ− θα1
(
1− e−(ρ−θα1)/λ
)
.
Note that ASL(λ) is increasing (in λ) function.
Assume that available depreciation rates have to place between two boundaries
λ and λ¯, i.e. 0 < λ ≤ λ ≤ λ¯ <∞. As one can easy see the condition (C) is
valid for this case. Let us denote
A = ASL(λ), A¯ = ASL(λ¯).
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Corollary 1. An optimal depreciation rate λ for SL method under restrictions
λ ≤ λ ≤ λ¯ has the following form
λ∗ =

λ, if (5.7) holds
λ¯, if (5.8) holds
λ˜, else
where λ˜ is a root of the equation ψASL(λ) =
u∗ + Γ
γi + Γ
− (1− ψ)B, and u∗ is
defined in (5.9).
For the non-linear method with rate η (see (3.7)) we have
A = ADB(η) =
η
ρ− θα1 + η .
The function ADB(η) also increases (in η).
If there are certain restrictions on depreciation rate η ≤ η ≤ η¯, then (C) is
also satisfied. Similar to previous considerations let us denote
A = ADB(η), A¯ = ADB(η¯).
Corollary 2. An optimal depreciation rate η for DB method under restric-
tions η ≤ η ≤ η¯ is the following
η∗ =

η, if (5.7) holds
η¯, if (5.8) holds
(ρ− θα1)A˜/(ψ − A˜), else
where A˜ =
u∗ + Γ
γi + Γ
− (1− ψ)B, and u∗ is defined in (5.9).
5.3. Taking into account restrictions
on depreciation policy
In previous Section where we derive an optimal depreciation policy we took
into account some exogenous restrictions at the depreciation rate. However,
there are restrictions which issue from the model.
One of these will be studied below and concerns gross profits (tax base for
corporate income tax) Zτt .
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It is well known that the presence of negative gross profits for a long period
of time is undesirable both for shareholders and for tax authorities. Lack of
supplies in budget may have a negative influence on investment climate.
In order to avoid this situation we will consider the following condition of
a positivity (non-negativity) of the gross profit in average (PGPA) at any
moment after investment under optimal investor behavior:
E(Zτ
∗
t | Fτ∗) ≥ 0, (a.s.) for all t ≥ τ∗ (5.10)
Remembering specification of Zτt from (3.1) and assumptions (4.3)–(4.4), we
have that condition (5.10) is equivalent to the following: for all t ≥ 0
(1− µ)piτ∗eα2t ≥ Iτ∗eθα1t
{
ψat+(1−ψ)bt+γp[1−ψât−(1−ψ)̂bt]
}
(a.s.),
where ât, b̂t are defined in (3.9).
Applying Theorem 1 one can reduce (5.10) to the inequalities: for all t ≥ 0
(1− u) β
β − 1 ·
ρ− α2
1− γi e
(α2−θα1)t ≥ ψat + (1− ψ)bt
+ γp[1−ψât−(1−ψ)̂bt], (5.11)
where u is defined in (5.3).
Inequalities (5.11) induce certain restrictions at depreciation policy. We study
such restrictions both for linear and non-linear methods.
Non-linear method (3.7)
Let ηa be a depreciation rate of active assets, ηb be a depreciation rate of
inactive assets. Then
at = ηae−ηat, bt = ηbe−ηbt, K = ψ
ηa
ηa+ρ−θα1 + (1− ψ)
ηb
ηb+ρ−θα1 ,
and (5.11) can be rewritten as follows: for all t ≥ 0
(1−u) β
β−1 ·
ρ−α2
1−γi e
(α2−θα1)t ≥ ψ(γp+ηa)e−ηat+(1−ψ)(γp+ηb)e−ηbt.
(5.12)
If we suppose that ηa ≥ ηb (depreciation rate for active assets is greater than
depreciation rate for active assets), then under the additional (nonsignificant)
condition α2+ηb ≥ θα1 inequality (5.12) holds for all t ≥ 0 if and only if
(1− u) β
β − 1 ·
ρ− α2
1− γi ≥ γp + ψ(ηa − ηb). (5.13)
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It is easy to see that inequality (5.13) will be valid for η ≤ η0 where η0 is a
root of the quadratic equation
(1− u) β
β − 1 ·
ρ− α2
1− γi = γp + ψ(ηa − ηb). (5.14)
Thus under the PGPA condition (5.10) the optimal depreciation rate for DB
method equals to η∗∗ = min(η∗, η0) where η∗ is defined in Corollary 2, and
η0 is a root of the equation (5.14).
Linear method (3.6)
For this case let λa be a depreciation rate of active assets, λb be a depreciation
rate of inactive assets. Then ât = min(λat, 1), b̂t = min(λbt, 1),
K = ψ
λa
ρ−θα1
(
1−e−(ρ−θα1)/λa
)
+(1−ψ) λb
ρ−θα1
(
1− e−(ρ−θα1)/λb
)
.
(5.15)
Suppose that α2 ≥ θα1. Then left side of inequality (5.11) increases in t, and
right side decreases in t. Therefore, (5.11) holds for all t ≥ 0 if and only if it
holds for t = 0, i.e.
(1− u) β
β − 1 ·
ρ− α2
1− γi ≥ γp + ψλa + (1− ψ)λb. (5.16)
As in linear case the inequality (5.16) is valid for λa ≤ λ0, where λ0 is a root
of the equation
(1− u) β
β − 1 ·
ρ− α2
1− γi = γp + ψλa + (1− ψ)λb. (5.17)
Thus, under PGPA condition (5.10) an optimal depreciation rate for linear
method is λ∗∗ = min(λ∗, λ0), where λ∗ is specified in Corollary 1 from The-
orem 3, and λ0 is a root of the equation (5.17).
Let us note that instead of positivity of gross profit in average one can consider
more general condition: expected gross profit at any moment after investment
has to be no less than a given value. In this way it is not difficult to obtain rel-
evant modifications of the boundaries λ0, η0 for the corresponding restrictions
in both linear and non-linear methods.
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5.4. Some numeric examples
In this Section we will present some results of the calculation of optimal
depreciation policy on real adjusted data.
In order to be clear, let the amount of necessary investment be constant
(i.e. α1 = σ1 = 0). As the “reasonable” area of parameters of the model
we will take α2 ∼ −1% − 2%, σ2 ∼ 0.1 − 0.15, the discount rate will be
ρ ∼ 10%− 20% (all parameters are annual).
In tables below, we will present the values of optimal depreciation rate for linear
and non-linear methods for different values of parameters of investment project
(expected rate of change in value added, volatility and share of active assets)
and discount. In order to simplify the situation, we will assume trivial the
exogenous restrictions on the depreciation rate, i.e. λ = η = 0, λ¯ = η¯ =∞.
In every tables we will denote λ∗ and η∗ as the optimal rate of investment for
SL and DB methods (Corollaries 1 and 2), λ0 and η0 – as the corresponding
upper bounds obtained from the conditions of positivity of gross profit in
average (5.10), i.e. the roots of equations (5.17) and (5.14).
Let us remark that conformably to recently adopted laws is integrated to the
regional budget a part of the corporate profit tax (at the rate of 16.5%15,
property tax (at the rate of 2%) and personal income tax (13% from payroll).
In Table 5.1 we show the dependence of the optimal depreciation rate for linear
and non-linear methods λ∗ and η∗, and the corresponding upper bounds λ0
and η0 for the condition of positivity of gross profit (5.10) on the average
rate of change of the value added of the project α2. Volatility of the project
equals σ2 = 0.12, discount equals 10%, the share of active assets in the initial
investment is ψ = 0.9, depreciation rate of inactive part of assets equals 5%
(for non-linear method), or nearly 3.5% (for linear method), and the share of
payroll (relatively to value added) equals 30%.
Table 5.1
α2 λ
∗ λ0 η∗ η0
-1% 0.47 0.15 0.90 0.21
0% 0.24 0.14 0.45 0.20
1% 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.19
2% 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.19
15 Taking into account the part of the tax dedicated to the local budgets
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Let us emphasize that in the present and following tables, boldface values
stands for the minimum of optimal depreciation rate and the corresponding
upper bounds of restrictions (5.10), i.e. for the optimal depreciation rate
under the condition of positivity of gross profit in average.
As we can see in this table, the optimal depreciation rate for a project with
an average rate of change in value added α2 has to be relatively high and
exceeds the restrictions consecutive to condition (5.10). Therefore, for those
projects the condition of positivity of the gross profit plays a primary role for
the choice of best depreciation. When the rate of change of value added
increases, the optimal rate of depreciation decreases and begins to satisfy the
condition (5.10).
The following table shows the dependence of the same indicators on the share
of active assets ψ. It is taken a project with parameters α2 = 1%, σ2 = 0.12,
other parameters are the same as above.
Table 5.2
ψ λ∗ λ0 η∗ η0
0.9 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.19
0.8 0.17 0.15 0.32 0.21
0.7 0.24 0.17 0.46 0.24
0.6 0.47 0.20 0.91 0.27
The increase of the optimal depreciation rate under decrease of ψ is not
difficult to obtain directly from Corollaries 1 and 2 of Theorem 3.
Table 5.3 demonstrates the dependence of above mentioned indicators on the
discount ρ and the average rate of change in value added α2. In this case the
volatility is σ2 = 0.15, the share of active assets is ψ = 0.9.
Let us notice that the sensitivity of optimal depreciation rate from the volatil-
ity can be high enough, and under small changes of volatility the optimal
depreciation rate can move on the frontier of those restriction.
But in many cases as it has been shown by our calculations, the value of
optimal depreciation rate is quite reasonable and corresponds quite well to the
practically used depreciation rates.
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Table 5.3
ρ λ∗ λ0 η∗ η0
(α2 = −1%)
10% 0.21 0.16 0.39 0.22
15% 0.49 0.23 0.91 0.29
20% 1.08 0.30 2.01 0.36
(α2 = 0%)
10% 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.21
15% 0.32 0.22 0.58 0.28
20% 0.65 0.29 1.21 0.36
(α2 = 1%)
10% 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.20
15% 0.21 0.22 0.38 0.28
20% 0.44 0.29 0.80 0.35
5.5. What does optimal depreciation policy bring
to the federal budget and investor?
The calculations presented in the previous section do not give however any
idea about the degree to which the optimal depreciation rate can influence
discounted tax payments into the federal budget and other indicators linked
to a given investment project (indicators which were discussed in Section 4.4).
In this Section we show how the optimal depreciation rate influences tax rev-
enue into the federal budget and also the net present value of the investor
(NPV). As a relative estimation of efficiency we will consider the ratio of the
indicator corresponding to the optimal depreciation rate to an indicator corre-
sponding to a “reference” depreciation rate. Since indicators depend on the
depreciation policy only by the integral of the discounted depreciation density,
in order to be clear we will only study the linear method of depreciation in
this Section. In this case, as a “reference” depreciation rate of active assets,
we will take λ0 = 20%, which corresponds to the current practice.
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Remember that starting from Section 5.3 we suppose the absence of both
tax holidays and risk process. In that case the formulas of Theorem 2 for
expected present tax payments from created enterprise into the budgets and
the expected NPV of investor can be simplified. The expression for presented
taxes into the regional budget T r(λ)16 is given in (5.3). For tax revenues into
the federal budget T f (λ) and the NPV of investor N (λ) are obtained the
following formulas:
T f (λ) = I0
(
pi0
I0p˜
)β
(1− u)−β [qf (1− u)− h3u− h4], (5.18)
N (λ) = I0
β − 1
(
pi0
I0p˜
)β
(1− u)−β+1, (5.19)
where qf =
γfva + γ
f
i (1− µ) + γ˜fs µ˜
(1− µ)(1− γi) ·
β
β − 1 , u = u(λ) is specified in (5.3),
h3 =
γfi
γi + Γ
(
1− γp
ρ− θα1
)
, h4 =
γfi
γi + Γ
(
Γ + γi
γp
ρ− θα1
)
.
If λ∗ denotes the optimal depreciation rate, then for the comparative efficiency
estimates we have the following expressions:
Er∗ =
T r(λ∗)
T r(λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u∗
)β
qr(1− u∗)− h1u∗ + h2
qr(1− u0)− h1u0 + h2 , (5.20)
Ef∗ =
T f (λ∗)
T f (λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u∗
)β
qf (1− u∗)− h3u∗ − h4
qf (1− u0)− h3u0 − h4 , (5.21)
EN∗ =
N (λ∗)
N (λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u∗
)β−1
, (5.22)
where u∗ corresponds to depreciation rate λ∗, and u0 – to the rate λ0 .
We will also estimate the comparative efficiency of a doubled “reference”
depreciation 2λ0 because this accelerated depreciation was adopted in the
former Russian tax system. Corresponding indicators are
Er2 =
T r(2λ0)
T r(λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u2
)β
qr(1− u2)− h1u2 + h2
qr(1− u0)− h1u0 + h2 , (5.23)
16 In this Section we will pay attention to the dependence of indicators on depreciation rate
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Ef2 =
T f (2λ0)
T f (λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u2
)β
qf (1− u2)− h3u2 − h4
qf (1− u0)− h3u0 − h4 , (5.24)
EN2 =
N (2λ0)
N (λ0) =
(
1− u0
1− u2
)β−1
, (5.25)
where u2 corresponds to the “doubled” depreciation rate 2λ0.
Before presenting the results let us make certain remarks.
The federal budget receives: the part of corporate income tax (at the rate of
7.5%), VAT (20%) and unified social tax (35% of payroll). As previously men-
tioned other taxes, i.e. a part of corporate income tax, the property tax and
the individual income tax are dedicated to the regional budget. This sharing
between the different budget levels is presented in the Budget Law 2001.
In order to derive the optimal rate of linear depreciation we use Corollary 1
of Theorem 3 without exogenous restrictions on depreciation rate (i.e.
λ = 0, λ¯ = ∞). The absence of such restrictions can sometime lead
either to very low or very high depreciation rates. Economically it is
not justifiable as it means a total absence of depreciation or “instantaneous”
depreciation (total deduction) of assets (remember that the problem
in this Section is treated from a regional point of view). At theoretical
level, this “singular” character of optimal depreciation only means
that the dependence of present tax payment into the regional budget
on depreciation rate is monotone (decreasing if λ∗ = 0, and increasing
if λ∗ = ∞). Therefore, this means that in presence of some
restrictions on the depreciation rate the region has to choose (in the
framework of an optimization approach) such a restriction as an optimal
depreciation rate.
The area of the considered parameters is previously discussed. Let us simply
mention that the discount in the calculation will be ρ = 10%, and linear
depreciation rate of inactive assets is fixed to 3%.
Table 5.4 presents the values of indicators (5.20)-(5.25) for projects with
large share of active assets (ψ = 0.9), large expected rate of change in value
added (α2 = 2%) and various volatilties (α2 = 2%) (low and high) with the
dependence on the “labor intensity” of the project (wage per unit of value
added µ˜).
In the Table 5.5 similar results are presented for investment project with small
rate of change in value added (α2 = 0).
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Table 5.4
µ˜ Er∗ Er2 Ef∗ Ef2 EN∗ EN2
(σ2 = 0.05)
0.2 1.01 0.97 0.91 1.12 0.90 1.14
0.35 1.01 1.01 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.14
0.5 1.11 1.06 1.32 1.13 1.34 1.14
0.65 1.25 1.11 1.33 1.14 1.34 1.14
(σ2 = 0.25)
0.2 1.15 0.95 0.80 1.03 0.76 1.04
0.35 1.06 0.97 0.82 1.04 0.80 1.04
0.5 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.04 0.96 1.04
0.65 1.05 1.02 1.09 1.04 1.09 1.04
Table 5.5
µ˜ Er∗ Er2 Ef∗ Ef2 EN∗ EN2
(σ2 = 0.15)
0.2 1.03 0.95 0.85 1.10 0.83 1.11
0.35 1.00 .99 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.11
0.5 1.06 1.03 1.25 1.10 1.26 1.10
0.65 1.18 1.08 1.25 1.11 1.26 1.11
(σ2 = 0.25)
0.2 1.11 0.94 0.78 1.05 0.74 1.06
0.35 1.04 0.97 0.85 1.05 0.83 1.06
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.06
0.65 1.08 1.03 1.13 1.06 1.13 1.06
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Let us notice that there is no sense in analyzing low volatility cases when rates
of change of α2 are small because the probability of investing in the project
(i.e. the passing by the process pit/It the optimal level p
∗) is very low. For
this reason in Table 5.5 are presented the projects with moderate volatility
(σ2 = 0.15) but not with low one.
Now present the values of the comparative efficiency indicators for a project
with moderate share of active assets (ψ = 0.5). Unlike the preceding case, we
focus our attention on both high and low rates of value added change, while
volatility is quite high (σ2 = 0.25).
Table 5.6
µ˜ Er∗ Er2 Ef∗ Ef2 EN∗ EN2
(α2 = 2%)
0.2 1.06 0.99 0.88 1.02 0.86 1.02
0.35 1.02 0.99 0.89 1.02 0.87 1.02
0.5 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.02
0.65 1.03 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.05 1.02
(α2 = 0)
0.2 1.04 0.99 0.86 1.02 0.83 1.03
0.35 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.03 0.93 1.03
0.5 1.01 1.01 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.03
0.65 1.04 1.02 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.03
Conducted calculations, numerous of which are not presented in the paper,
allows us to make the following conclusions about the efficiency of the optimal
depreciation policy.
First of all, for every “poorly technically rigged” investment projects (with
small share of active assets ψ ∼ 0.2), the optimal rate of depreciation is very
high. That means that the maximal admitted rate will be optimal for the
region. However for those projects the depreciation of active assets does not
play a great role, and optimal depreciation cannot bring additional revenue of
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more than 1% – 2% to regional budget. The efficiency of optimal depreciation
for federal budget and investor NPV is also low.
Technically rigged projects (with share of active assets ψ representing at least
half of the initial investment) present a more complicated picture. When
the value of “labor intensity” µ˜ (wage by unit of value added) is low then
the optimal depreciation rate is less than “reference” rate. The additional
increase of regional budget revenue can attain as far as 10 to 15% (when
volatility is high) but rapidly falls with a decrease in volatility. The fed-
eral budget and investor receive in that case considerably less revenue (less
than 10% – 25%). In parallel, the “double” depreciation policy is efficient
and can bring to federal budget and investor an increase of revenue of 10%
– 15%. When the share µ˜ increases (up to about 0.3 – 0.4), then hap-
pens an “equalization” of optimal and “reference” depreciation rates. In
that case double depreciation is profitable both for federal budget and in-
vestor, and can increase their revenue of about 10%. Under further increas-
ing µ˜ (beyond 0.5) the optimal depreciation rate exceeds the “reference”
rate and gives additional revenue both for the federal budget and the in-
vestor. In that case the relative efficiency of the optimal depreciation both
for the federal budget and investor is higher than for the regional budget.
The additional gain both for the federal budget and the investor can at-
tain 30% – 40% (when volatility is low) but significantly decreases with an
increase of volatility.
For projects rigged by active assets moderately, the picture is quite similar to
the preceding case. Let us simply remark that in that case the influence of
depreciation on the relative efficiency becomes a little less important.
Thus, optimal depreciation is able to bring a considerable positive effect for
the federal budget and the investor for the projects with the following features:
1) high share of active assets;
2) moderate “labor intensity” (in term of wage per unit of value added);
3) low or moderate volatility.
For such projects, optimal depreciation rate owns an incentive effect as it
forces the investor to launch the investment earlier. In other cases, the in-
centive effect of optimal depreciation rate (for federal budget and investor) is
sometimes not present at all.
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6. MODEL ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN
TAX SYSTEM
6.1. A comparative analysis of the former and the new
corporate profit taxation systems
In this Chapter we will use the model presented above in order to lead a
comparison between two taxation systems of firms profit in Russia. The
first system that will be referred to as the “former” system was in prac-
tice in Russia up to December 31, 2001. Its main characteristics relatively to
our study were:
1) tax profit rate 35% (11% are included into the federal budget, 19% into
regional budgets and 5% into local budgets);
2) tax holidays for new created enterprises for the length of the payback
period but not exceeding three years;
3) accelerated depreciation for the active part of assets (at the
linear method) with the acceleration rate not exceeding 2 (a
higher rate could be applied with the approval of regional fiscal
authorities).
From January 1, 2002, has been put into practice the new taxation system of
firm profits, which cancelled both tax holidays for newly created enterprises
and accelerated depreciation allowances. But profit tax rate decreased to 24%
(where 7.5% are dedicated to federal budget, 14.5% to regional budget and
2% to local budgets).
It will be conducted a comparison of the former and the new tax system using
the following indicators.
1. Optimal investment threshold p∗, which characterizes the moment of
implantation of the investor.
2. Expected optimal tax payments into consolidated budget T ∗, discounted
at the moment of time equal to 0 (base).
3. NPV of the investor N ∗, discounted at the moment of time equal to 0
(base).
4. Expected discounted tax burden B∗ of a created enterprise.
For the calculation purpose we fixed the following values for tax rates:
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– VAT γva = 20%;
– property tax γp = 2%;
– payroll tax γs = 35%;
– individual income tax γpi = 13%;
– corporate profit tax γi = 35% (in the former system) and γi = 24%
(in the new system)17.
Parameters of the investment projects are analyzed in intervals α1=0, σ1=0
(constant investment), α2 ∼ −1% – 2%, σ2 ∼ 0.05 – 0.5, and a discount
rate equal to ρ = 10%.
In order to simplify calculation we will postulate that there is no risk process,
i.e δ = 0. Depreciation rates have been fixed to 3% for the inactive part
of the assets and 20% for the active part of the assets (according to linear
method). For the former fiscal system we applied a tax holidays ν = 3 and
an acceleration rate equal to ka = 2.
In the tables below values of the ratios of above presented parameters are
shown for the former and new systems:
Rp =
p∗new
p∗old
, RT =
T ∗new
T ∗old
, RN =
N ∗new
N ∗old
RB =
B∗new
B∗old
for different investment projects scenarios.
Investment projects are separated into groups depending on the relative shares
of the active part of assets ψ and of payroll in the value added µ. The value
ψ can characterize “the technical performance” of the project (a technically
performing project is properly rigged with vehicles, mechanical equipment)
and the value µ characterizes the “intensity” of labor force within the project
(per unit of value added).
In Table 6.1 values of above mentioned ratios are exposed for a properly
technically rigged projects with a low payroll (ψ = 0.9, µ = 0.2).
In Table 6.2 analogous results are presented for an other extreme case, a poorly
technically rigged investment projects with high payroll (ψ = 0.2, µ = 0.7).
The results corresponding to the “intermediate case” with moderate values of
ψ are not presented.
17 All rates and others values in this Chapter are presented on an annual basis
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Table 6.1
α2 σ2 = 0.25 σ2 = 0.5
-1% Rp 0.85 0.85
RT 1.12 1.01
RN 1.30 1.11
RB 0.86 0.91
0% Rp 0.84 0.84
RT 1.09 1.00
RN 1.29 1.12
RB 0.86 0.90
1% Rp 0.83 0.83
RT 1.07 0.98
RN 1.28 1.13
RB 0.85 0.90
2% Rp 0.83 0.83
RT 1.04 0.97
RN 1.26 1.13
RB 0.85 0.89
Those numerous calculations allow us to present a number of conclusions
concerning the comparison of former and new tax systems. Let us emphasize
upon the fact that our conclusions only concern investment projects for newly
created enterprises for which the specific feature is a possibility to choose the
moment of investment.
Properly technically rigged investment projects (ψ ∼ 0.9). With the new sys-
tem, investor comes earlier (the optimal investment threshold under the new
system is less by 15% – 20% compared to the former system). The differ-
ence between fiscal revenues in the budget in the former and new systems
decreases with the increase of uncertainty (volatility of the project). With a
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Table 6.2
α2 σ2 = 0.25 σ2 = 0.5
-1% Rp 0.96 0.96
RT 1.07 1.02
RN 1.09 1.04
RB 1.00 1.00
0% Rp 0.95 0.95
RT 1.07 1.03
RN 1.11 1.06
RB 1.00 1.00
1% Rp 0.94 0.94
RT 1.08 1.03
RN 1.12 1.07
RB 0.99 1.00
2% Rp 0.93 0.93
RT 1.07 1.03
RN 1.13 1.08
RB 0.99 0.99
moderate volatility (about 0.25) the consolidated budget will receive about
10% to 20% extra revenue under the new system compared to the former one,
but if volatility is very high the consolidated budget will receive less under the
new system compared to the former one (about 5% for projects with a little
share of payroll µ ∼ 0.2 and 1% – 2% for those with a medium share µ ∼ 0.5).
Under the new system, the NPV of the investor is always greater than under
the former system (by about 30% for moderate volatility and by 5% – 7% for
high volatility). Tax burden for a created firm under the new fiscal system will
be slightly less than those under the former system: by about 10% to 15% for
a moderate volatility project and by about 5% for high volatility projects.
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Poorly technically rigged investment projects (ψ ∼ 0.2). For those projects,
depreciation allowances does not play a great role and a large share of payroll
µ is typical. Under the new system the investor comes at about the same
moment than with the former system (optimal levels of investment are very
close). Tax revenue in the budget between the new and former systems are
not significantly different (above all for high volatility projects). Tax burden
for the enterprise is nearly the same (with the high degree of precision). The
investor earns more profit in that case as in the preceding one, his NPV under
the new system is always higher (by 10% – 15% for moderate volatility projects
and by 3% for high volatility projects).
6.2. Estimation of the effect of the replacement
of property tax by real estate tax
From 1997 in certain cities of Russia (especially in Tver and Novgorod), the
real estate tax has been experimented. As previously mentioned, the exper-
iment was established conformably to Federal Law from 20.06.1997 “About
realization of the experiment under the taxation of the real estate in Great
Novgorod and Tver cities”. This law was initially adopted for three years and
was extended for an additional period of three years in 2000.
The main idea of this experiment was to replace multiple taxes (property tax
charged to enterprises, property tax charged to persons, land tax) by a unified
real estate tax.
The base for this tax was determined as the market value of the real estate
taxed at a flat rate for every real estate category18.
When property tax is replaced by real estate tax, some elements of active
assets (machinery, vehicles, equipment, stock, intangible assets and other
property excluding buildings and constructions) which represent a large part
of the base of the property tax, are no longer taxable. At the same time cost
of the buildings and constructions can be far from the market value.
Such a taxation system based upon market value is applied in a growing
number of countries and is favorable to the fiscal and stimulation function
both in countries with a developed market economy and countries in transition.
Real estate tax represents as much as 95% of local budget resources in the
Netherlands, 81% in Canada, 52% in France. In the USA, depending of the
State, this share represents from 10% to 70%. As reported by the World bank,
18 Land with buildings and constructions located on this land are considered as an object of
real estate
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in a selection of developing countries studied, this tax represents 40% to 80%
of the local budgets19.
Concerning its fiscal function, the real estate tax provides a stable level of
resources for local budgets as real estate is certainly one of the most stable
and identifiable fiscal object. As far as the stimulation function is concerned,
the fact that active assets are no longer taxed can stimulate the technical
renewal of production and the shift to the market prices while calculating a
tax base can lead to a more efficient use of the real estate resources.
As it will be shown later, in the framework of the proposed model, it is possible
to evaluate the experiments of Tver and Novgorod from the point of view of
investment activity in newly created enterprises.
Let us remark first that in the framework of our model this experiment means
the replacement of property tax P τt by
P˜ τt = γ˜p(1− ψ)It,
where γ˜p is the rate of real estate tax, and (1− ψ)It is the value of inactive
part of assets at the market price20.
In this case, the formula of expected present value of the investor will be the
following
V˜τ =
(1− µ)(1− γ̂i)
ρ+ δ − α2 piτ + Iτ
(
H1 − γ˜p(1− ψ)
ρ+ δ − α1 H˜2
)
,
where γ̂i and H1 are defined in (4.7), and
H˜2 = 1− γi +∆γi
[
1− e−(ρ+δ−α1)ν
]
.
Optimal moment of investment in the conditions of this experiment will be
τ˜∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : pit ≥ p˜∗It},
where p˜∗ =
(
1−H1+ γ˜p(1−ψ)
ρ+δ−α1 H˜2
)
· ρ+δ−α2
(1−µ)(1−γ̂i) ·
β
β−1 (cf (4.10)).
It is interesting to compare the optimal levels of investment for the current
fiscal system (with property tax) and the experimental one (with real estate
19 Data are taken from http://www.valnet.ru
20 The price of land is not included here, for which a properly developed method of estimation
does not exist yet
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tax). Let us suppose for simplification purpose that tax holidays are absent
(ν = 0). In that case it is obtained from formulas cited above:
R˜p =
p˜∗
p∗
=
1 +
γi
1− γi (1−K) +
γ˜p
ρ+ δ − α1 (1− ψ)
1 +
γi
1− γi (1−K) +
γp
ρ+ δ − θα1 (1−K)
,
where K = ψA0 + (1− ψ)B0, and A0, B0 are defined in (4.5).
From then we can see that the change in investment activity is defined by the
ratio between values
γ˜p
ρ+ δ − α1 (1− ψ) and
γp
ρ+ δ − θα1 (1−K).
Therefore, in order for the investor to come earlier in the experimental system,
(i.e. R˜p < 1), it is necessary the following inequality holds:
γ˜p
γp
· ρ+ δ − θα1
ρ+ δ − α1 <
1−K
1− ψ = 1−B0 +
ψ
1− ψ (1−A0).
This implies that in the experimental fiscal system the earlier arrival of the
investor will happen on the case where active part of assets ψ will exceed a
certain level ψ̂, equal to
ψ̂ =
B0 +
γ˜p
γp
· ρ+ δ − θα1
ρ+ δ − α1 − 1
B0 +
γ˜p
γp
· ρ+ δ − θα1
ρ+ δ − α1 −A0
.
In the following Table the calculations of threshold of the active part of assets
ψ̂ are presented for different values of depreciation rates (λ for linear method
– see (3.6), depreciation rate of inactive part of assets has been fixed to
3%) and of a risk parameter δ. In this case it has been supposed that the
revaluation of active assets is absent (θ = 0), discount rate has been fixed to
ρ = 10%, property and real estate taxes rates have been taken as established
in the experiments (γp = γ˜p = 2%), the average rate of growth of investment
resources (active assets) equaled α1 = 1%.21
Thus, the replacement of the property tax by the real estate tax stimulates the
coming of the investor only for properly technically rigged projects for wish the
share of active assets in the initial investment exceeds a certain “critical” value.
Under the absence of risk, this critical value is 60%–70% (a typical case),
and it decreases along with the increase of the risk factor (for a value of the
21 All values are presented on an annual basis
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Table 6.3
δ λ = 15% λ = 25%
0% 0.60 0.69
5% 0.42 0.52
10% 0.31 0.39
15% 0.24 0.31
risk parameter of the same order as the discount, the critical share ψ̂ decreases
by one half). This means that in a “risky” economy, the experimental fiscal
system is able to stimulate the investment activity in a larger area (for the set
of projects) than in an economy without risk.
6.3. Compensation of risk by means
of tax mechanisms
When we described the model of investor there were two types of random fac-
tors influence on investor’s profit from the project. The first one is connected
with “market” fluctuations of profits around an average values and is specified
by volatilities σ1 and σ2. These fluctuations can cause either a decrease in
profit or a increase (according to changes in prices, demand etc.). The second
type which is generated by social and legal environment leads to permanent
declining in investor’s cash flow. We will refer to those factors as risk (in
proper sense). In the framework of our model the influence of such a risk is
specified by average share of losses (in profit) per unit of time δ. Only this
risk is a subject of our study in this Section.
In order to formulate a risk compensation problem let us consider the following
hypothetical scheme. Suppose that the investor who follows the optimal be-
havior strategy, faces a dilemma: investing in a “risky” economy that provides
significant tax exemptions; or going to “no-risk” economy and not to have any
tax exemptions (or only minimal ones). There appears a question: which tax
exemptions can compensate (from the investor’s point of view) the risk factor.
We guess that the main criteria for the choice of one or another variant would
be its expected net present valueN 22. The exemptions may be connected with
22 We will write also N (·) in order to emphasize a dependence of NPV on the appropriate
parameter
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various tax mechanisms. Among such mechanisms we will pay our attention
on the following: reduction in profit tax rate, changes in depreciation policy,
and tax holidays (we shall notice that the role of the later is very limited in
the latest tax reform). If we denote such a tax mechanism under risk δ as
Mδ, then we call that mechanism Mδ compensates risk δ, if
N (δ,Mδ) ≥ N (0,M0). (6.1)
In present report we focus on the first two mechanisms: compensation by
means of profit tax rate reduction and compensation by means of depreciation
policy. We will assume that tax holidays are absent (ν = 0), and ignore (for
simplification) assets tax (i.e. put γp = 0). Parameters of the project and
discount rate will be assumed constant.
Compensation by means of profit tax rate
According to Theorem 2 the tax rate γδi compensates risk δ (in the sense of
relation (6.1)) if and only if:
(1− γδiKδ)1−β
(
1− γδi
ρ+ δ − α2
)β
≥ (1− γ0iK0)1−β
(
1− γ0i
ρ− α2
)β
, (6.2)
where γ0i is profit tax rate in “no-risk” economy,
Kδ=ψ
∞∫
0
ate
−(ρ+δ−θα1)tdt+ (1−ψ)
∞∫
0
bte
−(ρ+δ−θα1)tdt.
(6.2) implies
1− γδi
(1− γδiKδ)1−1/β
≥ 1− γ
0
i
(1− γ0iK0)1−1/β
(
1 +
δ
ρ− α2
)
. (6.3)
Since the left side of inequality (6.3) decreases in γδi (one can check it taking
a derivative) and is 1 when γδi = 0, then inequality (6.3) has a solution (in
γδi ) if and only if
1− γ0i
(1− γ0iK0)1−1/β
(
1 +
δ
ρ− α2
)
< 1, or δ < δ0,
where δ0 =
ρ− α2
1− γ0i
[
(1− γ0iK0)1−1/β − 1 + γ0i
]
.
Thus, if risk exceeds the “critical” value δ0, it cannot be compensated (from
the investor’s NPV point of view) by any reduction of profit tax rate. Taking
58 INVESTMENT STIMULATION
into account non-negativity of γiK0, we can give more crude, but more univer-
sal (depending on a smaller number of parameters) estimate
δ0 ≤ δ¯0 = (ρ− α2) γ
0
i
1− γ0i
. If we take γ0i = 35% as in most developed coun-
tries (which can be broadly considered as “no-risk”), then δ¯0 ≈ 0.54(ρ−α2).
Compensation by means of depreciation policy
Assume now that we wish to compensate risk δ by means of depreciation
schedule (aδt ) of an active part of the assets.
Let denote Kδ = ψ
∞∫
0
aδte
−(ρ+δ−θα1)tdt + (1 − ψ)
∞∫
0
bte
−(ρ+δ−θα1)tdt (de-
preciation of inactive part of assets is fixed).
In order to compensate risk δ (in the sense (6.1)) by depreciation (aδt ) the
following inequality must be satisfied:
(1− γ0iKδ)1−β
(ρ+ δ − α2)β ≥
(1− γ0iK0)1−β
(ρ− α2)β ,
where depreciation schedule (a0t ) (including in K0) corresponds to “non-risky”
case, or
1 +
δ
ρ− α2 ≤
(
1− γ0iK0
1− γ0iKδ
)1−1/β
. (6.4)
Since for any depreciation schedule Kδ ≤ ψ + (1− ψ)B0, where
B0 =
∞∫
0
bte
−(ρ+δ−θα1)tdt, the inequality (6.4) holds if and only if
1 +
δ
ρ− α2 <
(
1− γ0iK0
1− γ0i [ψ + (1− ψ)B0]
)1−1/β
, or δ < δ1,
where δ1 = (ρ− α2)
[(
1− γ0iK0
1− γ0i + γ0i (1− ψ)(1−B0)]
)1−1/β
− 1
]
.
Thus, like in the previous case (with profit tax rate), there is a “critical” value
of risk δ1, such that if risk is greater than this value, it can not be compensated
by any depreciation policy.
It is interesting to compare the boundaries δ0 and δ1. It is easy to see that{
1− γ0i + γ0i (1− ψ)(1−B0)]
}1−1/β
> (1− γ0i )1−1/β > 1− γ0i ,
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therefore, δ1 < δ0. This means that zone of risk which can be compensated by
any choice of depreciation policy is less than zone of risk which can be compen-
sated by a reduction of profit tax rate. In other words, depreciation mechanism
has smaller opportunities for risk compensation than profit tax rate.
As many calculations (conducted on real adjusted data) have demonstrated,
the frontier δ0 is normally located on the interval 0.02 – 0.04, and the frontier
δ1 is smaller (even several times smaller). From this fact we can draw the
conclusion that depreciation is clearly less able to compensate for risk than
the profit tax rate. Apart from this, the possibilities to compensate for risk
with the help of a reducing of the profit tax rate seem to be very limited.
6.4. The relation between depreciation rates
for linear and non-linear methods
As we mentioned above, all depreciable assets are divided according to the
new TC RF into ten groups depending on useful lifetime of the assets (Article
258). Assets from eighth to tenth groups (with useful lifetime more than
20 years) are depreciated by linear (straight-line) method, and from other
groups can be depreciated either by linear or non-linear (declining balance)
method according to enterprise’s choice (Article 259). Besides there is the
certain relation between rates of depreciation for linear and nonlinear methods,
namely, nonlinear rate must be two times greater than the relevant linear rate
(which is inverse to the useful lifetime). Similar relations exist in many other
tax systems. It may be a fixed relation (as in Australia) or a scale depending
on the useful lifetime of an asset (as in France or Spain)23.
Let us suppose that tax holidays are absent. Then, as one can see from the
formulas for calculating present value of the investor and present tax payments,
the basic indicators (connected with enterprise activity) depend only on the
present depreciation charges, i.e. on the integral of discounted depreciation
schedule (DDS)
A =
∞∫
0
ate
−ρt dt
This fact can be used in order to obtain the coefficients for the recalculation
of depreciation rate for different methods.
As it is well known, the use of non-linear method implies a problem of “tail”,
since complete depreciation of assets with this method is impossible for any
23 Data are taken from Cummins et al. (1996)
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given finite interval of time. In Article 259 of the TC RF this problem is solved
as follows. The non-linear method is used until when the residual cost of the
assets attains 20% of its initial value, after that this residual cost is taken as
a basis and it is depreciated using linear method before the end of the useful
lifetime of assets.
In this Section we will show how, in the framework of the proposed model it
is possible to obtain a relationship between depreciation rates under various
methods.
We will show that the existing system of “switching” between non-linear
method and linear method is not able to provide the invariance of DDS with
none of the possible recalculation coefficients. At the same time, taking an-
other “switching point” it is possible to provide the corresponding invariance.
So let L be the duration of useful life time of asset and q is the part of residual
cost (to its initial value) such as when it is attained a switch happens from
the non-linear to the linear method. In that case, DDS for the linear method
of depreciation equals
ASL =
1− e−ρL
ρL
. (6.5)
If η is the rate of depreciation for the non-linear method, the moment of switch
from the method T is defined by the following condition
RT = e−ηT = q, or ηT = ln q−1.
For this method of depreciation DDS will be equal to
ADB =
T∫
0
ηe−ηte−ρt dt+
L∫
T
RT
L− T e
−ρt dt.
If we take η = k/L, where 1/L is the rate of linear depreciation then it will
be obtained
ADB =
k
k + x
(
1− qe−yx)+ q
x(1− y)
(
e−yx − e−x) , (6.6)
where x = ρL, y = (ln q−1)/k.
Hence, the “equivalent” recalculation coefficient k0 has to be defined by the
following equality
ASL = ADB . (6.7)
From the formulas (6.5) and (6.7) follows that the coefficient k0 must only
be dependent on q and x. The main interest for us is the interval of value
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0.1 < x < 2, on which the values ρL are located when those values of discount
and the values of the duration of lifetime of assets (of the first to seventh
groups of depreciation) are “reasonable”. As it has been mentioned earlier,
according to the current TC RF q = 0.2 and the coefficient of recalculation
equals to k = 2. However, as conducted calculations show, in that case the
following inequality will be held
ASL < ADB , (6.8)
Let us note that the ratio ASL/ADB is varies from 0.99 for short lifetime, to
0.85 for long lifetime (from group 7). Moreover the inequality (6.8) remains
valid for every possible values k ≥ ln q−1 (for which T ≤ L). This means that
DDS calculated with linear method will always be less than DDS calculated
with the non-linear method with the “tail”.
Furthermore, if we change the switching point in the sense of an increase in
q, we can obtain “equivalent” recalculation coefficient. As a variant we took
q = 0.3, which means that the switching between the non-linear and linear
method happens when residual cost attains the level of 30% of the initial cost.
In Table 6.4, we present recalculation coefficients that provide the equality
(6.7) for various discount values and for existing groups of depreciated assets
(for each group it has been taken the intermediate period of lifetime).
Table 6.4
Groups Recalculation coefficient
ρ = 10% ρ = 20%
1 1.48 1.47
2 1.47 1.46
3 1.46 1.44
4 1.45 1.42
5 1.44 1.39
6 1.42 1.35
7 1.39 1.29
As this Table shows, the recalculation coefficient for the 30%-switching scheme
are located within the interval 1.4 – 1.5 and their dependence on the discount
is very weak (above all for assets with short or moderate life time period).
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The non-linear depreciation scheme with 20%-switching point (currently in
place) is unable to provide firms with an equivalent choice between linear and
non-linear methods for any recalculation coefficient between the rates. The
relative difference for the depreciation deductions listed above for the two
methods with a recalculation coefficient equal to 2 established by the TC RF
fluctuates between 1% – 2% for short life time period and 15% – 20% for
sufficiently long life time period of group 7. But for the non-linear scheme
with 30%-switching point there exist recalculation coefficients of depreciation
rates which lead to an “equivalent” choice between linear and non-linear meth-
ods. Those “equivalent” coefficients which depend on the discount and on
the useful life time of depreciated assets, are located (for “reasonable” values
of the parameters) within the interval 1.4 – 1.5, and are weakly sensible to
the change in discount.
6.5. Losses carry forward: various schemes
As we noted above, when we described the scheme of profit taxation, we made
a simplification. It concerns the case when costs exceed incomes and hence
firm incurs losses.
From the formula (3.10) for the present value of the firm one can see that, in
the case of negative profits, present tax payments are decrease also (propor-
tionally to the profit) with discounting. Practically, it means that losses are
fully (with interest) reimburse.
But this principle is too favorable for a firm. Actually, a majority of tax
systems allows to carry forward losses (i.e. to summarize losses and future
profits) without interest.
According to TC RF, tax base for negative profit is zero, and losses are allowed
to carry forward as deductions from tax base. Such deductions are subject to
some restrictions: first, they are limited to a certain time interval (10 years);
and, second, they can not reduce tax base by more than 30%.
Unfortunately, this actual scheme is enough difficult for investigation. Most of
all, it does not concern numeric calculations, but a study of the dependencies
of indicators of investment activity on different parameters. From this point
of view the proposed scheme of losses’ “full reimbursement”, seems to be
valuable enough both for analysis and calculations. We will follow this scheme
in the future.
In order to understand how much this scheme is far from an actual one, we
describe below a model of “actual reimbursement” scheme and then we give
estimates for comparison of these two schemes.
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1. For simplicity we will consider deterministic processes of value added and
required investments. It is assumed also that tax holidays are absent (ν = 0),
and investment moment equals τ .
Let firm’s profit at the moment t after investing (t > τ) be Zt = Qt − Dt,
where Qt be value added minus payroll fund, both assets and social taxes, and
Dt be the depreciation charges
24. Suppose, that the profit is negative for some
initial period after investing (for τ ≤ t < τ + t0), and positive for t ≥ τ + t0.
We will also ignore temporal limitations for losses carry forward and consider
that this carry forward can be performed for unbounded time interval25.
For this profit the levied tax according to TC RF is the following:
T˜t =

0, if τ ≤ t ≤ τ + t0
γi(Zt − lt), if τ + t0 < t ≤ τ + t˜1
γiZt, if t > τ + t˜1
,
where lt is the flow of deductions (on loss reimbursement) continued up to
the moment when all accumulated losses (that is
τ+t0∫
τ
(−Zt) dt) will be com-
pensated. Thus, the moment t˜1, which specifies ending the deductions, can
be found from the relation
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
lt dt = −
τ+t0∫
τ
Zt dt.
Since deductions must not decrease tax base by more than the share ϕ
(0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1), then it is natural to put lt = ϕZt. Therefore, the moment
t˜1 is defined from the relation
τ+t0∫
τ
Zt dt+ ϕ
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zt dt = 0. (6.9)
The net present value of the firm, derived according the proposed “actual
reimbursement” scheme is
24 Here we will skip index τ which specifies an investment moment
25 Practice of unbounded losses carry forward takes place in some countries (for example,
in Germany, Great Britain, Chile, Estonia – see Problems of Tax System in Russia ..., 2000)
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V˜τ =
∞∫
τ
(Qt − T˜t)e−ρ(t−τ) dt =
τ+t0∫
τ
Qte
−ρ(t−τ) dt
+
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
[Qt−γi(1−ϕ)Zt]e−ρ(t−τ) dt+
∞∫
τ+t˜1
[(1−γi)Qt+γiDt]e−ρ(t−τ) dt.
The difference with the net present value of the firm, derived according the
“full reimbursement” scheme (formula (3.10)) equals
V˜τ − Vτ =
τ+t0∫
τ
[Qt − (1− γi)Qt − γiDt]e−ρ(t−τ) dt
+
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
[Qt − γi(1− ϕ)Zt − (1− γi)Qt − γiDt]e−ρ(t−τ) dt
= γi
 τ+t0∫
τ
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt+ ϕ
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt
 . (6.10)
Using the negativity and positivity of Zt at correspondent intervals, we have
τ+t0∫
τ
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt ≤ e−ρt0
τ+t0∫
τ
Zt dt,
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt ≤ e−ρt0
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zt dt.
Further, (6.10) implies
V˜τ − Vτ ≤ γie−ρt0
 τ+t0∫
τ
Zt dt+ ϕ
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zt dt
 = 0
due to condition (6.9).
Therefore, NPV for the “actual reimbursement” scheme is always less (no
greater) than NPV for the “full reimbursement” scheme.
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Note, that if we determine the moment of deductions ending t¯1 not as in
(6.9), but from the equality of discounted losses and discounted deductions,
i.e. by the relation
τ+t¯1∫
τ+t0
lte
−ρ(t−τ) dt = −
τ+t0∫
τ
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt,
then (6.10) implies that the relevant V˜τ is the same as Vτ . This means that
the scheme proposed in our model is equivalent to the scheme with limited
deduction where the ending deductions t¯1 determines from the principle of
“discounted reimbursement”. It is easy to see that the moment t¯1 is always
greater than the analogous moment t˜1, specified by (6.9).
2. Let us pass to an estimating rate of approximation of one scheme by
another.
In order to avoid too complicated formulas, we will assume that the amount
of required investments is time-independent (i.e. It ≡ I), the value added
pit grows exponentially with the rate α2 = α, and not take into account the
property tax (i.e. put γp = 0). Then Qt = (1−µ)pit is the value added minus
payroll fund and social tax. Furthermore, we will gather all assets in one
common group and will depreciate its by the single manner (by depreciation
schedule (at, t ≥ 0)).
We have:
τ+t0∫
τ
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt =
t0∫
0
Qτ+te
−ρt dt− I
t0∫
0
ate
−ρt dt
=
1− µ
ρ̂
piτ
(
1− e−ρ̂t0
)
− I(A0 −At0),
τ+t˜1∫
τ+t0
Zte
−ρ(t−τ) dt =
t˜1∫
t0
p˜iτ+te
−ρt dt− I
t˜1∫
t0
ate
−ρt dt
=
1− µ
ρ̂
piτ
(
e−ρ̂t0 − e−ρ̂t˜1
)
− I(At0 −At1),
where ρ̂ = ρ− α, At =
∞∫
t
ase
−ρs ds. Then (6.10) implies
V˜τ−Vτ = 1−µ
ρ̂
piτ
(
1−(1−ϕ)e−ρ̂t0−ϕe−ρ̂t˜1
)
−I [A0−(1−ϕ)At0−ϕAt˜1] ,
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and, taking into account that Vτ =
(1− µ)(1− γi)
ρ̂
piτ + γiIA0 (see formula
(4.8)), we have the following relative estimate of an approximation of “actual
reimbursement” scheme by the proposed “full reimbursement” scheme:
Rτ :=
V˜τ − Vτ
Vτ
=
pτ (1− µ)E˜ − ρ̂A˜
pτ (1− µ) + ρ̂γiA0 ,
where pτ=piτ/I, E˜=1−(1−ϕ)e−ρ̂t0−ϕe−ρ̂t˜1 , A˜=A0−(1−ϕ)At0−ϕAt˜1 .
Taking the optimal investment moment τ∗ from Theorem 1, we obtain
Rτ∗ =
γi
ρ− αγiA0
(
ρ
1− γiA0
1− γi E˜ − (ρ− α)A˜
)
(6.11)
The derived estimation (6.11) depends on t0 t˜1, which specify a period of
tax deductions. As one can see the moment t0 can be specified as
t0 = max{t ≥ 0 : Qt+τ ≤ Dt}, (6.12)
(here we suppose, of course, that Qτ ≤ D0, else profit will be positive forever),
and t˜1 is a root of the equation
g1(t) = g2(t), (6.13)
where
g1(t)=(1−ϕ)
t0∫
0
Ds ds+ϕ
t∫
0
Ds ds, g2(t)=(1−ϕ)
t0∫
0
Qτ+s ds+ϕ
t∫
0
Qτ+s ds.
Further calculation of the values t0 and t˜1 in (6.12) and (6.13) depends on
concrete depreciation methods. We have carried out numerous calculations
both for linear and non-linear methods. As model’s parameters we took α ∼
1% − 2%, ρ ∼ 10% − 15% (all are on annual basis), tax rate γi = 24%,
maximal share of taxable profit deductions ϕ = 30% (as the new TC RF
establishes). Those calculations showed that for “intermediate” depreciation
rates (related to the “intermediate” useful lifetimes of assets 5–10 years) the
relative approximation rate Rτ∗ from a replacement of actual reimbursement
scheme by the proposed full reimbursement scheme does not exceed 5%.
Finally note that analogous estimates can be derived also for the discounted
tax payments into the budget.
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7. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
In this Chapter, will be described the mathematical tools, which will be used to
study the proposed model. We will deal with an optimal stopping problem for
multi-dimensional stochastic process. This problem appears in determination
of an optimal moment for investment (3.11).
We propose a new approach to find the optimal stopping time for multi-
dimensional diffusion processes. On the basis of this approach an explicit
formula for the optimal investment moment in the case of two-dimensional
geometric Brownian motion and homogeneous objective functional will be
obtained26.
7.1. The optimal stopping time for multi-dimensional
diffusion process
Let (ξt = (ξ1t , . . . , ξ
m
t ), t ≥ 0) be multi-dimensional diffusion process with val-
ues in Rm, which is described by the following system of stochastic differential
equations:
dξit = ai(ξt)dt+
m∑
k=1
bki(ξt)dwkt , (t ≥ 0), i = 1, . . . ,m, ξ0 = x0 (7.1)
where a = (a1, . . . , am), bk = (bk1, . . . , bkm) are continuous vector functions
on Rm, (wkt , t ≥ 0), k = 1, . . . ,m are independent Wiener processes, x0 is
the initial state.
Let us consider an optimal stopping problem for this process:
Ee−ρτg(ξτ )→ max
τ
, (7.2)
where g : Rm → R1, and the maximum is taken over a certain class of Markov
times τ (where the class of all Markov times M is usually examined).
Though the general theory of an optimal stopping is well developed (see,
for example, Shiryaev, 1978; Oksendal, 1998), there are very few problems
which have solutions in an explicit form. The traditional approach to solving a
26 The results of this Chapter were presented at the Conference on Stochastic dynamic
optimization (Vienna, 2002) and the World Congress of Bachelier Finance Society (Crete,
2002)
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problem (7.2) is the heuristic method of “smooth pasting” (or “high contact”)
for the differential equations with free boundary.
Let L be the generator of process (7.1), defined on functions from C2(Rm),
which is given by the formula:
Lf(x) =
m∑
i=1
ai(x)f ′xi +
1
2
m∑
i,j=1
m∑
k=1
bki(x)bkj(x)f ′′xixj .
In order not to consider degenerative (deterministic) processes, we will as-
sume that L is an elliptic operator, i.e. eigenvalues of a diffusion matrix
‖∑mk=1 bki(x)bkj(x)‖ are positive.
Let F (x) be the optimal functional value in problem (7.2), and G={x∈Rm :
g(x) < F (x)} is “continuation region”. Then F (x) as a function of initial
state of process ξ0 = x, satisfies the differential equation LF (x) = ρx in G
and “continuous pasting” condition F (x) = g(x) at the boundary ∂G.
The specific feature of this problem is that the region G is unknown and is
a subject of the search. In order to find this region, some additional condi-
tions are usually involved, which are connected with equality of derivatives of
functions F (x) and g(x) (“smooth pasting”) on the boundary ∂G27. The gen-
eral theory offers some sufficient conditions, for which the solution received
by “smooth pasting” method, will be optimal (see, for example, Shiryaev,
1978). Unfortunately, these conditions are not practically checked. There-
fore “smooth pasting” method is considered for concrete optimal stopping
problems as only heuristic method of the solution finding, whose optimality
requires additional proof28.
7.2. Variational approach to optimal stopping problems
We propose the other approach to solve an optimal stopping problem (7.2). It
is known from the general theory, that the optimal stopping time can be pre-
sented as the first exit time from some “continuation region” for diffusion pro-
cess (see, for example, Shiryaev, 1978; Oksendal, 1998). The approach below
is based on a variation of “continuation region” over the given class of regions.
27 Sometimes it is considered partial derivatives or derivatives in direction. The variants
of “smooth pasting” conditions one can find in Shiryaev (1978), Oksendal (1998). Such
problems for differential equations with free boundary are called Stefan’s problems
28 Let us note, that the “smooth pasting” method can give in some cases both “maximal”
and “minimal” solution, or no solution at all. In this sense all the solutions of optimal
stopping problem from Dixit and Pindyck (1994), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Trigeorgis
(1996) are not rigorous
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Let G be some class of “continuation regions” in Rm, G ∈ G.
Let τG = τG(x) = min{t ≥ 0 : ξt /∈ G} be the first exit time from region G
for the process ξt, described by the equations (7.1) with initial state ξ0 = x.
Let M(G) = {τG, G ∈ G} be a set of the first exit times for all regions
from class G.
It is known, that under some assumptions the function
u(x) = Ee−ρτGg(ξτG)
is the solution of Dirichlet boundary problem:
Lu(x) = ρu(x), x ∈ G, (7.3)
u(x) → g(a), when x→ a, x ∈ D, a ∈ ∂D. (7.4)
(Variants of this statement that sometime named as the Feynmann-Kac for-
mula, under various assumptions one can find in Karatzas and Shreve, 1991;
Krylov, 1996; Oksendal, 1998.)
Fix the initial state of process (7.1) ξ0 = x0. Then for each continuation
region G ⊂ G we will consider the solution of the problem (7.3)–(7.4) uG(x0)
as a functional on set of regions G.
Thus, a solving an optimal stopping problem (7.2) over a class of the Markov
times M(G) can be reduced to a solving the following variational problem:
uG(x0)→ max
G∈G
. (7.5)
If G∗ is an optimal region in (7.5), the optimal stopping time in the class
M(G) coincides with the first exit time from this region: τ∗(G) = τG∗ . If
the class of regions G is chosen “well”, it is possible to prove that the mo-
ment τ∗(G) will be also an optimal stopping time for problem (7.2) over
all Markov times M. In the following Section such approach will be real-
ized for two-dimension geometric Brownian motion ξt and for homogeneous
objective function g.
Let us note, that the calculation of the optimal stopping time over a given class
of regions represents, to our opinion, a peculiar interest. Indeed, the optimum
continuation region for multi-dimensional diffusion processes can have very
complex structure, therefore it has a sense to restrict our consideration to
more simple regions, thus solution for problems (7.3)–(7.4) and (7.5) can be
obtained by numerical methods.
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7.3. Two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion
We will apply the proposed approach to solve an optimal stopping problem
for the case of two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion.
Let us consider the following two-dimensional diffusion process ξt = (ξ1t , ξ2t ),
t ≥ 0, which will described the processes of value added and amount of
investment:
dξ1t = ξ
1
t (α1dt+ σ1dw˜
1
t ), ξ
1
0 = x1,
dξ2t = ξ
2
t (α2dt+ σ2dw˜
2
t ), ξ
2
0 = x2,
(7.6)
where pair (w˜1t , w˜
2
t ) is two-dimensional Wiener process with correlated com-
ponents: Ew˜1t w˜
2
t = rt, (|r| ≤ 1).
In order to reduce this process to the canonical form (7.1), we introduce new
Wiener processes
w1t = w˜
1
t , w
2
t = (w˜
2
t − rw˜1t )/
√
1− r2 ( if |r| < 1).
As one can see, the processes w1t and w
2
t are uncorrelated (Ew
1
tw
2
t = 0)
and, thus, are independent. Therefore, the process ξt can be presented in the
following form:
dξ1t = ξ
1
t (α1dt+ σ1dw
1
t ),
dξ2t = ξ
2
t [α2dt+ σ2(rdw
1
t +
√
1− r2dw2t )],
(7.7)
where w1t and w
2
t are independent Wiener processes.
As continuation regions in R2+ we will consider a family of sets depending on
the parameter p of the following type
Gp = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ : x2 < px1}, p ≥ 0.
For the process ξ = (ξ1t , ξ2t ), described by the system of equations (7.6) with
initial state x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+, let us denote τp(x)=min{t≥0 : ξt /∈Gp} =
min{t ≥ 0 : ξ2t ≥ pξ1t } – the first exit time from region Gp.
Let us consider the following functional
Fp(x) = Exe−ρτp(x)g(ξτp(x)), x ∈ R2+
(the upper index x at the expectation symbol emphasizes, that the process ξt
starts from the point x). If x /∈ Gp, then τp(x) = 0 and, hence, Fp(x) = g(x).
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Let us remind, that the function g : R2+ → R1 is called a homogeneous
(of degree q) function, if
g(λx) = λqg(x) for all x ∈ R2+ and λ ≥ 0.
Let us denote σ˜2 = σ21 − 2rσ1σ2+σ22 – “total” volatility of the process (7.6),
and assume that σ˜ > 0.
Theorem 4. Let function g(x) be a homogeneous (of degree q) function.
Let α¯i = αi+
q−1
2
σ2i (i = 1, 2). Suppose the following conditions hold:
α2 − 12σ
2
2 ≥ α1 −
1
2
σ21 , (7.8)
ρ > α¯1q. (7.9)
Then:
Fp(x1, x2) =
{
g(1, p)p−βxq−β1 x
β
2 , if x2 < px1
g(x1, x2), if x2 ≥ px1
,
where β is the positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ˜2β(β − 1) + (α¯2 − α¯1 − q − 12 σ˜
2)β − (ρ− α¯1q) = 0. (7.10)
Further we will use this theorem for the cases of the unit and zero degrees of
homogeneity.
The variation problem (7.5) in the considered case has the following form:
Fp(x0)→ max
p≥0
. (7.11)
The explicit form of the functional Fp from Theorem 1 allows us to find the
solution for the problem (7.11) and, therefore, the solution of optimal stopping
problem (7.2) over the class of Markov times M(G0), where G0 = {Gp, p ≥
0}.
Let us denote h(p) = g(1, p)p−β (0 ≤ p <∞).
Theorem 5. Let the conditions of Theorem 4 hold, and p∗ be a point of
maximum of function h(p). Then :
1) the maximum in problem (7.11) is attained if p = p∗ (and thus does not
depend on x0);
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2) optimal stopping time for problem (7.2) over the class M(G0) is
τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : ξ2t ≥ p∗ξ1t },
3) optimal value of the functional for problem (7.2) over the class M(G0),
depending on initial state (x1, x2) of the process (7.6) is
Φ(x1, x2) =
{
h(p∗)xq−β1 x
β
2 , if x2 < p
∗x1
g(x1, x2), if x2 ≥ p∗x1
. (7.12)
It is turned out that under some additional conditions the set Gp∗ determines
also an optimal stopping time for problem (7.2) over the class of all Markov
times M.
Theorem 6. Let the conditions of Theorem 4 hold, g ∈ C2(R2+), p∗ be a
point of strict maximum of function h(p)29, and the following relations are
satisfied for all p ≥ p∗:
h′(p) ≤ 0, (7.13)
pg′′x2x2(1, p)− (β − 1)g′x2(1, p) ≤ 0. (7.14)
Then τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : ξ2t ≥ p∗ξ1t } is the optimal stopping time for prob-
lem (7.2) over all Markov times M, and the function (7.12) is the opti-
mal value of the functional in (7.2) depending on initial state (x1, x2) of
the process (7.6).
For the proof of this theorem we use the sufficient conditions of optimality
for the stopping time based on a method of variational inequalities (see, for
example, Bensoussan and Lions, 1987; Oksendal, 1998).
Let us consider a corollary of this theorem for the linear function g(x1, x2) =
x2 − x1. This case arises in a problem of the optimal timing for investment.
Corollary. Let g(x1, x2)=x2−x1, condition (7.8) hold, and ρ>max(α1, α2).
Then τ∗ = min{t ≥ 0 : ξ2t ≥ p∗ξ1t }, where p∗ = β/(β − 1), and β is the
positive root of the quadratic equation
1
2
σ˜2β(β − 1) + (α2 − α1)β − (ρ− α1) = 0.
The formula for the optimal stopping time for a difference of two geometric
Brownian motions was first given (from heuristic arguments) in McDonald and
Siegel (1986). The strict proof of an optimality, and the conditions at which
this formula is hold, appeared later (Hu and Oksendal, 1998).
29 I.e. h(p∗) > h(p) for p 6= p∗
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Let us notice in conclusion, that if maximum point p∗ > 0, then the necessary
condition of optimality is the following
h′(p∗) = 0, or p∗g′x2(1, p
∗) = βg(1, p∗),
and it coincides with a “smooth pasting” condition for optimal value of the
functional (7.12):
Φ′x2(x1, p
∗x1 − 0) = g′x2(x1, p∗x1).
Thus, for two-dimensional geometric Brownian motion and homogeneous ob-
jective function “smooth pasting” conditions follows from Theorem 5.
7.4. Proofs
The proof of Theorem 4. We will need the following
Lemma. If condition (7.10) holds, then τp(x) < ∞ (a.s.) for any x ∈ R2+
and p > 0.
The proof. From the explicit representation for (one-dimensional) geometric
Brownian motion in (7.6) we have:
ξ2t
ξ1t
=
x2
x1
exp{(α˜2 − α˜1)t+ σ2w˜2t − σ1w˜1t }, (7.15)
where α˜i = αi − 12σ2i (i = 1, 2). According to the law of iterated logarithm
for Wiener process (see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991)
lim sup
t→∞
|w˜it|/
√
2t log log t = 1 a.s. (i = 1, 2).
Therefore, (7.15) implies that under α˜2 ≥ α˜1
lim sup
t→∞
ξ2t /ξ
1
t =∞ a.s.
Hence, τp(x)=min{t≥0 : ξ2t /ξ1t≥p}<∞ for any x∈R2+ and p>0 under (7.8).
Return to the proof of Theorem 4. First of all show that Fp(x) is a homoge-
neous (of degree q) function.
Since τp(x) is a first exit time over the level p of a process ξ2t /ξ
1
t , then formula
(7.15) implies that function τp(x) is homogeneous (of zero degree) in x=(x1, x2).
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Furthermore, the linear homogeneity of process ξt in initial point and homo-
geneity of function g imply:
Fp(λx) = Eλxe−ρτp(λx)g(ξτp(λx)) = E
λxe−ρτp(x)g(ξτp(x))
= Exe−ρτp(x)g(λξτp(x)) = λ
qFp(x),
i.e. Fp(x) is homogeneous (of degree q) function.
Let us find Fp(x) as a solution of Dirichlet problem (7.3)–(7.4). Homogeneous
function Fp(x) can be represented as
Fp(x1, x2) = x
q
1f(y), where y =
x2
x1
, f(y) = Fp(1, y).
Then
y′x1 = −
y
x1
, y′x2 = −
1
x1
,
F ′x1 = qx
q−1
1 f(y) + x
q
1f
′(y)
(
− y
x1
)
= xq−11 [qf(y)− yf ′(y)],
F ′x2 = x
q−1
1 f
′(y),
F ′′x2x2 = x
q−2
1 f
′′(y),
F ′′x1x2 = (q−1)xq−21 f ′(y)+xq−11 f ′′(y)
(
− y
x1
)
=xq−21 [(q−1)f ′(y)−yf ′′(y)],
F ′′x1x1 = (q − 1)xq−21 [qf(y)− yf ′(y)] + xq−11
[
qf ′(y)
(
− y
x1
)
+
y
x1
f ′(y)
− yf ′′(y)
(
− y
x1
)
] = xq−21 {(q − 1)[qf(y)− yf ′(y)]
− y[(q−1)f ′(y)−yf ′′(y)] }=xq−21 {(q−1)[qf(y)−2yf ′(y)]+y2f ′′(y)}.
From the relation (7.7) we have that the generator of the process ξt is
LF (x)=α1x1F ′x1+α2x2F
′
x2+
1
2
σ21x
2
1F
′′
x1x1+rσ1σ2x1x2F
′′
x1x2+
1
2
σ22x
2
2F
′′
x2x2 .
(7.16)
Equation (7.3) and formula (7.16) for the elliptic operator L lead to the
following relation
ρf(y)=α1[qf(y)−yf ′(y)]+α2yf ′(y)+12σ
2
1
{
(q−1)[qf(y)−2yf ′(y)]+y2f ′′(y)}
+rσ1σ2y[(q − 1)f ′(y)− yf ′′(y)] + 12σ
2
2y
2f ′′(y),
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or
1
2
y2f ′′(y)σ˜2 + yf ′(y)[α¯2 − α¯1 − q − 12 σ˜
2]− f(y)(ρ− α¯1q) = 0. (7.17)
The solution of second-order homogeneous differential equation (respect to
function f(y)) (7.17) will be found in the type f(y) = Cyβ , where C is a
constant. In this case β must be a root of the quadratic equation (7.10).
If (7.9) is satisfied, the equation (7.10) has two roots: positive β1 and negative
β2. Hence, any solution of equation (7.17) for 0 < y < p has the following
type:
f(y) = C1yβ1 + C2yβ2 , where β1 > 0, β2 < 0,
or, returning to initial function,
Fp(x1, x2)=C1x
q−β1
1 x
β1
2 +C2x
q−β2
1 x
β2
2 , if 0 < x2 ≤ px1, x1 > 0 (7.18)
By the condition (7.4), if x2 → 0 and x2 < px1 then Fp(x1, x2)→ g(x1, 0),
therefore C2 = 0 in representation (7.18). C1 is found from the boundary
condition at the line {x2 = px1}, namely,
Fp(x1, px1) = C1x
q
1p
β1 = g(x1, px1) = x
q
1g(1, p),
i.e. C1 = g(1, p)p−β .
Theorem is proved.
The proof of Theorem 5. Let us take any x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ and show that
Fp(x) ≤ Fp∗(x) for all p ≥ 0.
By the definition of p∗ we have for the homogeneous function g:
g(x) = xq1g
(
1,
x2
x1
)(
x2
x1
)β (
x2
x1
)−β
= h
(
x2
x1
)
xq−β1 x
β
2 ≤ h(p∗)xq−β1 xβ2 .
Let p ≤ p∗. Then Theorem 4 gives:
if x2 ≥ p∗x1 then Fp(x) = g(x) = Fp∗(x);
if px1 ≤ x2 < p∗x1 then Fp(x) = g(x) ≤ h(p∗)xq−β1 xβ2 = Fp∗(x);
and if x2 < px1 then Fp(x) = h(p)x
q−β
1 x
β
2 ≤ h(p∗)xq−β1 xβ2 = Fp∗(x).
Thus, Fp(x) ≤ Fp∗(x) when p ≤ p∗. Similar arguments prove inequality
Fp(x)≤Fp∗(x) for p > p∗. Thus, maximum for the problem (7.11) is attained
at p = p∗. From this and the definition of class M(G0) follows Theorem 5.
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In order to prove optimality of stopping time τ∗ over all Markov times M
we use “verification theorem”, based on variational inequalities method (see
Bensoussan and Lions, 1987; Oksendal, 1998). We formulate it below.
Let us denote P x – a distribution of a process ξt (in space of trajectories)
starting from the initial point ξ0 = x, Ex – an expectation with relate to the
distribution P x.
Theorem (Oksendal, 1998). Suppose, there exists a function Φ : Rm+ → R1,
satisfying the following conditions:
1) Φ ∈ C1(Rm+ ), Φ ∈ C2(Rm+ \ ∂D);
here and further D={x∈Rm+ : Φ(x)>g(x)}, and ∂D is a boundary of set D,
2) ∂D is locally the graph of Lipschitz function and
Ex
∞∫
0
χ∂D(ξt) dt = 0 for all x ∈ Rm+ ;
3) Φ(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Rm+ ;
4) LΦ = ρΦ for x ∈ D;
5) LΦ ≤ ρΦ for x ∈ Rm+ \ D¯ (D¯ is a closure of the set D);
6) τD= inf{t ≥ 0 : ξt /∈ D} <∞ a.s. (with respect to P x) for all x ∈ Rm+ ;
7) the family {g(ξτ )e−ρτ , τ ≤ τD} is uniformly integrable (with respect to
P x) for all x ∈ D.
Then τ∗ = τD is an optimal stopping time for the problem (7.2) over all
Markov times, and Φ(x) is an optimal value of functional.
The proof of Theorem 6. As a candidate we try the function Φ(x1, x2), defined
in(7.12). For x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+, x1 6= 0 let denote p(x) = x2/x1.
Since h(p∗) > h(p) for all p 6= p∗, then for x2 < p∗x1 we have
Φ(x1, x2) = h(p∗)x
q−β
1 x
β
2 > h(p)x
q
1 (x2/x1)
β
= xq1g (1, x2/x1) (x2/x1)
−β (x2/x1)
β = g(x1, x2)
(the latter equality follows from the homogeneity of the function g).
Therefore, Φ(x)≥g(x) for all x∈R2+, and the domainD={x∈R2+ : Φ(x)>g(x)}
coincides with {x2<p∗x1}={(x1, x2) : 0≤p(x)<p∗}. Furthermore, τD=
inf{t≥0 : ξt /∈D}= inf{t≥0 : ξ2t≥p∗ξ1t }<∞ a.s. for all x∈R2+ due to Lemma.
Show that condition 7) of the verification theorem follows from (7.9). Indeed,
if τ ≤ τD then ξ2τ ≤ p∗ξ1τ and, therefore,
Φ(ξτ )e−ρτ=h(p∗)(ξ1τ )
q
(
ξ2τ
ξ1τ
)β
e−ρτ≤h(p∗)(p∗)β(ξ1τ )qe−ρτ=g(1, p∗)(ξ1τ )qe−ρτ .
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Hence, from an explicit formula for geometric Brownian motion we have:
Ex[Φ(ξτ )e−ρτ ]k ≤ gk(1, p∗)xkq1 Ex exp{[−ρτ + q(α1 −
1
2
σ21)τ + qσ1w
1
τ ]k}
= gk(1, p∗)xkq1 E
x exp{−[ρ−α¯1q−12q
2σ21(k−1)]kτ+kqσ1w1τ
− 1
2
k2q2σ21τ} ≤ gk(1, p∗)xkq1 Ex exp{kqσ1w1τ −
1
2
k2q2σ21τ},
if k > 1 is chosen such that ρ− α¯1q − 12q2σ21(k − 1) ≥ 0 (due to condition
(7.9)). Since Mt = exp{qσ1w1t − 12q2σ21t} is a martingale (see, for example,
Karatzas and Shreve, 1991), then EMτ = EM0 = 1. Thus
sup
τ≤τG
Ex[Φ(ξτ )e−ρτ ]k ≤ gk(1, p∗)xkq1 ,
and uniform integrability of the family {Φ(ξτ )e−ρτ , τ ≤ τG} holds.
Condition 4) of the verification theorem follows immediately from the defini-
tion of function Φ when x2 < p∗x1.
Let us take now x2 ≥ p∗x1, i.e. p ≥ p∗ and, therefore, Φ(x1, x2) =
g(x1, x2) = x
q
1g(1, p). Repeating arguments, similar to those in derivation
of equality (7.17), we have:
Lg−ρg=xq1
[
1
2
p2g′′x2x2(1, p)σ˜
2+pg′x2(1, p)(α¯2−α¯1−
q−1
2
σ˜2)−g(1, p)(ρ−α¯1q)
]
.
Condition (7.13) implies pg′x2(1, p) ≤ βg(1, p). From this and (7.9) it follows:
x−q1 (Lg−ρg)≤
1
2
p2g′′x2x2(1, p)σ˜
2+pg′x2(1, p)
[
α¯2−α¯1−q−12 σ˜
2− 1
β
(ρ−α¯1q)
]
=
1
2
pσ˜2[pg′′x2x2(1, p)− (β − 1)g′x2(1, p)] ≤ 0
(here we use the fact that β is a root of equation (7.10) and condition (7.14)).
Thus, condition 5) is also fulfilled. Hence, all the conditions of the verification
theorem hold and, therefore, τD = τ∗ is an optimal stopping time in (7.2)
over the class of all Markov moments M.
Concerning the proof of Corollary from Theorem 6 we note that requirement
ρ > α2 implies β > 1.
Theorem 1 follows immediately from Corollary to Theorem 4 and formula (4.7)
for discounted firm’s profits.
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The proof of Theorem 2. Statements 1)–3) follow from the formulas for
discounted firm’s profits and tax payments into budgets (from the Section
5.2) and Theorem 4 (for the function g(x) = x2 − x1).
In order to prove 5) put g(x) = 1. Then by Theorem 1 we have:
Ee−φτ
∗
= pi0β˜(p∗I0)−β˜ , (7.19)
where β˜ is a positive root of the equation
0.5σ˜2β(β − 1) + (α2 − α1 + σ21 − rσ1σ2)β − φ = 0. (7.20)
Differentiating the equality (7.19) in φ, we have
Eτ∗e−φτ
∗
= pi0β˜(p∗I0)−β˜ β˜′φ log(p
∗I0/pi0). (7.21)
Taking a derivative in φ at equation (7.20), we obtain
β˜′ρ=
(
σ˜2β˜+α2−α1+σ21−rσ1σ2−0.5σ˜2
)−1
=
(
σ˜2β˜+α2−α1+0.5σ21−0.5σ22
)−1
.
Put it in (7.21):
Eτ∗e−φτ
∗
=pi0β˜(p∗I0)−β˜
(
σ˜2β˜+α2−α1+0.5σ21−0.5σ22
)−1
log (p∗I0/pi0) .
(7.22)
One can easy see from (7.20) that β˜ → 0 when φ→ 0. Thus, taking a limit
in (7.22) when φ→ 0, we obtain the statement 5). Theorem is proved.
8. CONCLUSIONS
A model of investor’s behavior in the real sector of the Russian economy taking
into account risk and uncertainty was constructed in this paper. The model
considers such elements of the Russian tax system as corporate profit tax, value
added tax, social tax, property tax, depreciation mechanisms and tax holidays.
Within the framework of the model an optimal timing rule for investment under
NPV criterion was obtained. One of the results was an explicit (analytical)
derivation of this rule based on the properties of the tax system (listed above),
parameters of the investment project, discount rate and risk process. There
was also derived the explicit dependence of the investor’s expected net present
value and the expected present tax payments from the new firm into the federal
and regional budgets on the tax system parameters.
8. CONCLUSIONS 79
The mutual effect of tax holidays and accelerated depreciation on the investor
behavior was also studied. One of the results obtained in the paper were the
conditions for which the mutual usage of those exemptions negatively affects
the investment activity (thus postponing the investment in the project).
The problem of finding a depreciation policy which maximizes expected tax
revenues in regional budget was considered, and the optimal policy was ob-
tained in an explicit form. Optimal depreciation rates were derived for both
linear and non-linear methods. The problem of finding an optimal depreci-
ation rate under the restriction on positivity of expected gross profits was
studied as well.
Calculations on real adjusted data have shown how the optimal depreciation
rates for linear and non-linear methods depend on the expected rate of change
of value added, the share of active assets and on the discount rate.
The influence of optimal (from the regional point of view) depreciation policy
on the tax payments into the federal budget and on the investor’s NPV was
studied. This influence was estimated on the basis of the ratio of efficiency
indicators under the optimal depreciation rates to the corresponding indica-
tors under some other ”reference” depreciation rate. We classify investment
projects by groups, within each group indicators of efficiency behave nearly
the same way. In particular, it has been shown that the optimal depreciation
policy for the region can bring considerable gains both to federal budget and
to the investor. (The latter is true if the project has a high share of active
assets, an average level of labor intensity in terms of wage per unit of value
added, and a less than too high volatility. For those types of projects the
optimal depreciation stimulates the investor and forces him to invest earlier).
Within the framework of the proposed model, the authors compared the effi-
ciency of former and new profit taxation schemes for the newly created enter-
prises. The optimal investment threshold which characterizes the moment of
the arrival of the investor, expected tax payments into the consolidated budget,
investor’s NPV, and expected present tax burden for the enterprise given the
optimal investor behavior were all considered as criteria for comparison. The
calculations of these indicators using real adjusted data have shown that, for
the investment projects with a high share of active assets, the new system of
profit taxation substantially outperforms the old one. The difference between
the two systems decreases, however, with the increase of projects volatility.
A modified model of investor behavior was proposed for the case of the replace-
ment of property tax by real estate tax (the Novgorod and Tver experiment
modeling). The explicit formula for the threshold of investment as a function
of all parameters of the model was obtained in the modified model. It was
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shown that the replacement of property tax by real estate tax would stimulate
the arrival of the investor if the share of active asset for the project exceeds a
certain critical value (the project is sufficiently capital-intensive). The explicit
formula for this threshold was derived.
The possibilities of compensating the NVP risk by the means of a reduction
in the profit tax rate and changes in depreciation policy were studied in the
framework of investor’s model. The authors determined the zone of risk for
which losses could not be compensated by any of tax mechanisms listed above.
The analysis of the usage of non-linear depreciation method according to the
article 259 of TC RF was conducted. It was shown that the 20%-critical level
of the ratio of residual cost to initial cost for switching between non-linear and
linear methods, established by the law, did not provide an equivalent choice of
depreciation method. It was demonstrated that for the 30%-switching point
the equivalence of the depreciation schemes permitted by law can be provided
by the relevant recalculation coefficients derived in this report.
Two schemes of losses carry forward induced by taxation were studied. One of
them, actual, is established by the new tax code, and the other, a simplified
one, was taken from the model. In the deterministic case of a model approx-
imation estimates for replacement of actual scheme by the “simplified” one
were obtained.
The construction and investigation of the model of investor behavior gave
an impulse to develop a new mathematical approach to the optimal stop-
ping problem for the multi-dimensional diffusion processes. We propose a new
variational method for finding an optimal “continuation region”, based on the
representation of the functional of multi-dimensional diffusion process at the
boundary point as a solution of Dirichlet problem. Using this method, the com-
plete solution of the optimal stopping problem for two-dimensional geometric
Brownian motion and a homogeneous (of any non-negative degree) objective
function was obtained. This permits a detailed analysis of the investor model.
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